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Abstract
Pakistan’s successive constitutions, which enumerate guaranteed fundamental rights and pro-
vide for the separation of state power and judicial review, contemplate judicial protection of vul-
nerable sections of society against unlawful executive and legislative actions. This Article focuses
upon the remarkably divergent pronouncements of Pakistan’s judiciary regarding the religious
status and freedom of religion of one particular religious minority, the Ahmadis. The superior
judiciary of Pakistan has visited the issue of religious freedom for the Ahmadis repeatedly since
the establishment of the State, each time with a different result. The point of departure for this ex-
amination is furnished by the recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan (”Supreme
Court” or “Court”) in Zaheeruddin v. State,’ wherein the Court decided that Ordinance XX of 1984
(”Ordinance XX” or ”Ordinance”), which amended Pakistan’s Penal Code to make the public prac-
tice by the Ahmadis of their religion a crime, does not violate freedom of religion as mandated
by the Pakistan Constitution. This Article argues that Zaheeruddin is at an impermissible variance
with the implied covenant of freedom of religion between religious minorities and the Founding
Fathers of Pakistan, the foundational constitutional jurisprudence of the country, and the dictates
of international human rights law. This Article is divided into four parts. Part I presents Zaheerud-
din and identifies its main themes, holdings, and assumptions. Part II argues that there exists in
Pakistan an implied covenant of religious freedom with religious minorities based upon the pro-
nouncements of the Founding Fathers of the State. Part III examines the three phases of judicial
practice regarding the freedom of religion of religious minorities. Part IV examines the evolu-
tion, scope, and domestic applicability of international freedom of religion norms. This Article
ends by drawing some broader conclusions regarding judicial practice in post-colonial settings.
First, the Article concludes that because of the instability of constitutional governance in these
settings; the judicial branch is insufficiently insulated from political currents. The result is that
dominant political forces and ideological constructs assert a determinative influence over judicial
pronouncements. Second, judicial choices, constructions, and applications of sources of appli-
cable norms are indeterminate and contingent. Consequently, doctrinal underpinnings of judicial
pronouncements are inconsistent, unpredictable, and often arbitrary. Third, by demonstrating a
willingness to accommodate dominant political forces at the expense of constitutional mandates,
the judiciary becomes party to the erosion of its own independence and legitimacy. This sustained
erosion renders the judiciary even less equipped to fulfill its assigned constitutional role to protect
fundamental rights in general, and the rights of politically vulnerable minorities in particular.
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Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his reli-
gion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion
or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.1
INTRODUCTION
Repression of and discrimination against minorities is as old
as recorded history itself.' Religious minorities are no exception
to this phenomenon.5 In modern times, the search for princi-
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1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2. The concept and definitions of a minority remain vague in social science litera-
ture. See generally Arnold M. Rose, Minorities, 10 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA Soc. Sci. 365-71
(1968); Christen T.Joanssen, Towards Standardization of a Conceptual Scheme for Minority
Group Research, 8 ETHNICrrY 121 ('1981). This Article defines minorities as groups:
[N]umerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-domi-
nant position, whose members-being nationals of the state-possess ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.
Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, U.N.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 34th
Sess., at 96, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979).
3. See generally Patrick Thornberry, Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? International Law,
and Minority Rights, 15 TEx. INT'L L J .421 (1980) (presenting development of interna-
tional law regarding protection of minorities); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitar-
ianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 615 (1991) (discussing
role of majorities in defining minorities and majority attempts to acculturate minority
ethnic community); THE PROTECFION OF MINORrriEs AND. HuN RIGHTs (Yoram Din-
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ples and processes to combat repression of religious minorities
has taken three complementary paths: political compromise,
constitutional guarantees, and international codes of conduct.
Politically, adherents of diverse religious persuasions together ar-
rive at express. or implied covenants of reciprocal respect, pro-
tection, and cooperation. Constitutionally, many basic laws pro-
vide guarantees of freedom of belief and practice of religion,
and furnish means of redress when these guarantees are injeop-
ardy. Internationally, modern international law prescribes ex-
press codes of conduct that oblige all members of the interna-
tional community to protect the fundamental human right of
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
But political compacts, constitutional guarantees, and inter-
national normative codes are, in any given setting, only as good
as their actual practice. Judicial practice related to freedom of
religion of religious minorities is of particular interest to lawyers
and legal scholars. How does the judiciaryreceive political cove-
nants aimed at the protection of religious minorities? Are judi-
cial pronouncements informed by express international human
rights norms? Does the judiciary furnish adequate protection of
constitutional guarantees? Is the judiciary sufficiently insulated
from political currents to guard against potential tyranny of shift-
ing majorities? Any exploration of these questions, of necessity,
implicates the efficacy ofjudicial review, understood as a method
of subordinating state action to higher normative principles,4
stein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992) (discussing conceptual and specific problems of pro-
tecting rights of minorities); JAY A. SIGLER, MINoRrI RIGHTS: A COMPARATVE ANALYSIS
15-19 (1983) (discussing population movement as historical root cause for minority
problems); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW. AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORrrEs
(1991) (discussing transition in international law from protection of minority rights to
establishment of universal human rights); PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (Catherine Brblmann et al. eds., 1993) (discussing evolution of minority rights in
area of international law).
4. Judicial review is traditionally understood as the process whereby ajudicial body
determines the constitutionality of activity undertaken by the legislative and executive
branches of government. The genesis of judicial review begins with the pronounce-
ments of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). For the theory ofjudicial
review and its practice in different legal systems, see RONALD D.. ROTUNDA ET AL., 1
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 1.1-.4 (1986); EDWARD
MCWHINNEY, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING WORLD 140-57 (3d ed. 1965)
(discussing practice of judicial review in member states of British Commonwealth);
Mauro Cappelletti, Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective, 58 CAL. L. REV. 1017 (1970)
(discussing historical antecedents of judicial review and spread of judicial review from
United States to numerous other countries); Mauro Cappelletti, "Who Watches the Watch-
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and some broader and fundamental postulates regarding the re-
lationship between law and society.'
This Article explores these questions through an examina-
tion of the practice of the superior judiciary of Pakistan as it re-
lates to the freedom of religion and religious minorities.' Paki-
stan's successive constitutions, which enumerate guaranteed fun-
damental rights and provide for the separation of state power
men?": A Comparative Study on Judicial Responsibility, 31 AM.J. COMP. L. 1 (1983) (discuss-
ing models ofjudicial review and suggesting trend toward judicial responsibility to citi-
zens of each society).
5. The dominant paradigm regarding the relationship between law and society is
that of Evolutionary Functionalism, which posits that law and society are separate social
categories and that laws should be described and explained in terms of their functional
responsiveness to changing social needs. See PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY
OF AN IDEA (1980). In modem American legal thought, the Realist School dominates
the vision of evolutionary functionalism. American Realists, who posit law as being self-
consciously directed towards the satisfaction of social needs, do not recognize any fun-
damental division between law and public policy. American Realists postulate legal au-
tonomy only in that policymakers ought to be insulated from the pressures of short-
term needs. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935) (characterizing "functionalism" as assault upon all dog-
mas and devices that cannot be translated into terms of actual experience); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1960) (discussing con-
ceptual and pedagogical approaches of legal realism); Lon L. Fuller, Amercan Legal
Realism, 82 U. PA. L. Rxv. 429 (1934) (presenting succinct enunciation of American
realism); WILLIAM W. FISHER III ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1993). Some contem-
porary interventions in legal thought, particularly those represented by critical legal
studies, feministjurisprudence, and critical race theory, further advance the realist the-
sis that legal forms cannot be understood apart from their social context. Because
these interventions see society as stratified along class, gender, and race lines, law is
seen as an instrument of coercion and legitimation. See, e.g., ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE
CITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) (discussing evolution of conceptual frame-
work of critical legal studies); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARI A FEMINIST THEORY
OF ThE STATE (1989) (presenting feminist critique of conventional approaches to law);
Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA.
L. REv. 461 (1993).
6. The choice of Pakistan is influenced by the fact that in recent years the country
has been cited repeatedly for discrimination and persecution of religious minorities.
See, e.g., Persecuted Minorities and Writers in Pakistan, 5 NEWS FROM ASIA WATCH, Sept. 19,
1993, at I (citing discrimination and persecution in Pakistan on basis of religion); Perse-
cution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 36 I.C.J. REv. 16 (1986) (reviewing passage
of legislation criminalizing minority religious practices that offend religious feelings of
majorities); HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCATES, INC., HUMAN RIGHTS IN PAKISTAN 9-10 (1987)
(reporting diminishment of judicial authority because of ordinances and orders
promulgated under martial law); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, PAKISTAN:
HUMAN RIGHTS AFTER MARTIAL LAW: REPORT OF A MISSION (1987) (reporting inade-
quacy of protection of human rights); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PAKISTAN: VIOLATIONS
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6-7 (1985) (reporting patterns and instances of human rights viola-
tions). See also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1994) (documenting human rights
violations in Pakistan).
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and judicial review, contemplate judicial protection of vulnera-
ble sections of society against unlawful executive and legislative
actions. The record of Pakistan's superior judiciary in the area
of protection of religious minorities, however, is very uneven and
has gone through three distinct phases. The first phase is re-
markable for its unequivocal protection of freedom of religion
and religious minorities. The second phase represents a con-
traction of this protection through undue deference to the for-
mal constitutional amendment process prescribed by the Consti-
tution. The last, and current, phase is one in which the judiciary
has capitulated before the ascendant forces of religious reaction
and abdicated judicial protection of religious minorities. This
Article examines the context, nature, and doctrinal determi-
nants of judicial practice in all three phases.
This Article focuses upon the remarkably divergent pro-
nouncements of Pakistan's judiciary regarding the religious sta-
tus and freedom of religion of one particular religious minority,
the Ahmadis.7 The superior judiciary of Pakistan has visited the
7. The Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908), who claimed
to be the promised Messiah or Mehdi and a successor to Muhammad, the prophet of
Islam. While Ahmadis claim to be a reform movement within Islam, mainstream Mus-
lims, for whom the finality of prophethood of Muhammad is a cardinal article of faith,
consider them heretics. See generally YoHANAN FRIEDMANN, PROPHECY CONTINUOUS: As-
PErs OF AHMADI RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND ITS MEDIEVAL BACKGROUND 1-2, 16-22, 119-
126 (1989) [hereinafter FRIEDMANN];James Robson, The Ahmadis, in 2 RELIGION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 349 (A.J. Arberry ed., 1969) (discussing history of Ahmadis); MUHAMMAD
ZAFRULLA KHAN, AHMADIWyAT: THE RENAISSANCE OF ISLAM (1978) (presenting sympa-
thetic exposition of Ahmadi creed); SPENCER LAVAN, THE AHMADIYAH MOVEMENT: A
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE (1974) (discussing Ahmadi movement from a detached per-
spective); MAHMUD AHMAD, AHMADYYAT, OR THE TRUE ISLAM (1951) (arguing that
Ahmadis are true Muslims) [hereinafter AHMAD, AHMADIYYAT]; S. ABDULHASAN NADW,
QADiANISM: A CRrrIcAL. STUDY (1967) (arguing that Ahmadi doctrines are false); ABu'L-
ALA MAWDUDI, THE QADANI PROBLEM (1979) (arguing that Ahmadis are not Muslims).
Central to the doctrinal conflict between Ahmadis and other Muslims is the question of
Khatm-i-Nabuwat (cessation of prophethood). The mainstream Muslimn position is that
Muhammad was the last prophet of God and there can be no legitimate prophet after
him. The Ahmadi position, one fraught with ambiguity, ranges from the view that
Mirza Ghulam Abmad was a prophet, to one which holds that he was a "reflector
prophet," as opposed to a law-bearing and independent prophet. Still another view is
that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was not a prophet at all but a mujaddid (reformer). FRIED-
MANN, supra, at 16-22. This issue is the source of schism even among the Ahmadis them-
selves. One group, popularly known as "Qadianis," regard Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a
prophet, whereas another group, popularly known as "Lahoris," regard him as a mujad-
did. Id. Commentators note the "chronically partisan nature of the issue and its 'polit-
ical sensitivity' in Pakistan." Charles H. Kennedy, Towards the Definition of a Muslim in an
Islamic State: The Case of Ahmadiyya in Pakistan, in RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC MINORITY Pou-
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issue of religious freedom for the Ahmadis repeatedly since the
establishment of the State, each time with a different result. The
point of departure for this examination is furnished by the re-
cent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan
("Supreme Court" or "Court") in Zaheeruddin v. State,' wherein
the Court decided that Ordinance XX of 1984 ("Ordinance XX"
or "Ordinance"),9 which amended Pakistan's Penal Code to
make the public practice by the Ahmadis of their religion a
crime, does not violate freedom of religion as mandated by the
Pakistan Constitution.
This Article argues that Zaheeruddin is at an impermissible
variance with the implied covenant of freedom of religion be-
tween religious minorities and the Founding Fathers of Pakistan,
the foundational constitutional jurisprudence of the country,
and the dictates of international human rights law. This Article
is divided into four parts. Part I presents Zaheeruddin and identi-
fies its main themes, holdings, and assumptions. Part II argues
that there exists in Pakistan an implied covenant of religious
freedom with religious minorities based upon the pronounce-
ments of the Founding Fathers of the State. Part III examines
the three phases of judicial practice regarding the freedom of
religion of religious minorities. Part IV examines the evolution,
scope, and domestic applicability of international freedom of
religion norms.
This Article ends by drawing some broader conclusions re-
garding judicial practice in post-colonial settings. First, the Arti-
cle concludes that because of the instability of constitutional gov-
ernance in these settings; the judicial branch is insufficiently in-
sulated from political currents. The result is that dominant
political forces and ideological constructs assert a determinative
influence over judicial pronouncements. Second, judicial
choices, constructions, and applications of sources of applicable
TICS IN SOUTH ASIA 71 (Dhirendra Vajpeyi & Yogendra K. Malik eds., 1989) [hereinafter
Kennedy]. The air of intimidation and fear that surrounds this question is evidenced
by the fact that, with the exception of the Pakistan Human Rights Commission, not
many non-Ahmadi voices have been raised publicly in Pakistan to question the.persecu-
tion of Ahmadis. HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN, STATE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
PAKISTAN 1993 (1994).
8. Zaheeruddin v. State, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) 1718 (1993) (Pak.).
9. Ordinance XX of 1984: Anti-Islamic Activities of Quadiani Group, Lahori
Group and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Ordinance, 1984, 36 P.L.D. 102
(1984) (Pak.) [hereinafter Ordinance XX of 1984].
(Vol. 19:40
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norms are indeterminate and contingent. Consequently, doctri-
nal underpinnings ofjudicial pronouncements are inconsistent,
unpredictable, and often arbitrary. Third, by demonstrating a
willingness to accommodate dominant political forces at the ex-
pense of constitutional mandates, the judiciary becomes party to
the erosion of its own independence and legitimacy. This sus-
tained erosion renders the judiciary even less equipped to fulfill
its assigned constitutional role to protect fundamental rights in
general, and the rights of politically vulnerable minorities in par-
ticular.
I. THE ZAHEERUDDIN CASE AND ORDINANCE XX
Zaheeruddin is the Supreme Court of Pakistan's response to
appeals by Ahmadis, challenging their criminal prosecution and
penalization under Ordinance XX on the ground that the Ordi-
nance violated, inter alia, their right to freedom of religion, as
mandated by Article 20 of the Constitution.' ° Article 20 of the
Constitution provides that "[s]ubject to law, public order and
morality: (a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice
and propagate his religion," and that "(b) every religious de-
nomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to estab-
lish, maintain and manage its religious institutions."1
Entitled "The Anti-Islamic Activities of the Quadiani Group,
Lahori Group, and Ahmadis (Prohibition and Punishment) Or-
dinance, 1984,"12 Ordinance XX purports that "it is expedient to
amend the law to prohibit the Quadiani group, Lahori group,
and Ahmadis from indulging in anti-Islamic activities." Ordi-
nance XX amended the Pakistan Penal Code to make the public
10. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1733 (Pak.). Ahmadis also challenged Ordi-
nance XX on the grounds that it violated Article 19 (providing for freedom of speech)
and Article 25 (providing for equality of citizens and equal protection of law) of the
Pakistan Constitution. Id.
11. PAR. CONST. (1973) art. 20, reprinted in XIV CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1986). The two earlier
Pakistan constitutions, those of 1956 and 1962, contained identical language. See
SAFDAR MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PAmuTAN 251-52, 631 (1990)
[hereinafter MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS].
12. Ordinance XX of 1984, 36 P.L.D. at 102 (Pak.). The designations "Quadiani"
and "Lahori" refer to the two schools of thought among the Ahmadis. See FRIEDMANN,
supra note 7, at 16-22. See generally Linda J. Berberian, Pakistan Ordinance XX of 1984:
International Implications on Human Rights, 9 Loy. L.A. Irr'L & COMP. L.J. 661, 680-87
(1987) (analyzing origin and international human rights implications of Ordinance
XX).
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practice of the Ahmadi religion a crime."3
In Zaheeruddin, the minority opinion of Justice Shafiur
Rehman found much of the Ordinance ultra vires of the Consti-
tution.' 4 The majority opinion by Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaud-
hry, however, dismissed all appeals and upheld the whole of Or-
dinance XX.15 The bulk of the majority opinion is devoted to
establishing the proposition that Ahmadis are not Muslims be-
cause their beliefs and theological doctrines are at variance with
13. Ordinance XX of 1984, 36 P.L.D. at 103 (Pak.). The substance of the Ordi-
nance is as follows:
298-B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain holy
personages orplaces.- (1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group
(who call themselves Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either
spoken or written, or by visible representation,-
(a) refers to or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion
of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as 'Ameer-ul-
Mumineen', 'Khalifa-tul-Mumineen', 'Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen' 'Sahaabi' or
'Razi Allah Anho';
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the Holy
Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as 'Ummul-Mumineen';
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family
(Ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as Ahle-
bait; or
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as 'Masjid';
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call them-
selves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or writ-
ten, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers
followed by his faith as 'Azan', or recities [sic] Azan as used by the Muslims,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.
298-C. Person of Quadiani group, etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or
propagating his faith. Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group
(who call themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name), who, directly or indi-
rectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or
preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words,
either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner what-
soever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall be punished with im-
prisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years
and shall also be liable to fine.
Id.
14. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.CL) at 1739, 1742-44, 1746-49 (Pak.). Specifically,
Justice Rehman found clause (d), subsection (2) of section 298-B, and portions (c) and
(d) of section 298-C ultra vires of articles 19, 20, and 25 of the Constitution. Id.
15. Id. Justices Muhammad Afzal Lone and Wali Muhammad Khan co-signed the
opinion, whereas Justice Saleem Akhter wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id.
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the beliefs of the majority of Muslims.1 6 The Court emphasized
this point notwithstanding the fact that appellants' counsel had
made it clear that this issue was not before the Court, and that
the Court must provide the Ahmadis with Article 20 protection
irrespective of their religious classification. The Court reasoned
that in prohibiting the use of distinguishing characteristics of Is-
lam by the Ahmadis, Ordinance XX was in line with statutes that
regulate commercial activity, target deceptive trade practices,
and protect trademarks.1 7 The Court then noted that, "[f] or ex-
ample, the Coca[-] Cola Company will not permit anyone to sell,
even a few ounces of his own product in his own bottles or other
receptacles, marked Coca[-] Cola, even though its price may be a
few cents."1 8 The Court acknowledged that religious freedom is
not confined to religious beliefs, but rather extends to "essential
and integral" religious practices.19 It claimed, however, that the
appellants had not explained how the prohibited epithets and
public rituals were an essential part of their religion.2" The crux
of the problem, according to the Court, was that the Ahmadis,
whom the Court characterized as "an insignificant minority"2"
and "hypersensitive,"22 use epithets:
[I] n a manner which to the Muslim mind looks like a deliber-
ate and calculated act of defiling and desecration of their
holy personages; [and which] is a threat to the integrity of
'Ummah' [Islamic community] and [the] tranquillity of the
nation, and it is also bound to give rise to a serious law and
order situation, like it happened many a time in the past.2 3
16. Id. at 1749, 1765-68, 1775-77. The Court used quotations from leading
Ahmadi texts to establish their variance with fundamental tenets of Muslims' beliefs. Id.
17. Id. at 1751-53. To maintain this line of reasoning, the Court relied upon sec-
tion 20 of the Indian Company Law, Chapter X of the Trade and Merchandise Marks
Act of 1958 of India, Chapter XVII of the Indian and Pakistan Penal Codes, English
Company Law, and Bollinger v. Costa Brava Wine Co., Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 966 (1959) (U.KI).
Id. at 1752. Pakistan's judiciary, like that of other post-colonial common law jurisdic-
tions, treats case law and other authoritative texts from other common law jurisdictions
as strong persuasive authority. Pakistan's constitutional cases are rife with citations to
Indian, English, and American cases and treatises. See generally H. Patrick Glenn, Persua-
sive Authority, 32 McGiu. LJ. 261 (1987); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Trans-
judicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. Rxv. 99 (1995).
18. Zaheemddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1753-54 (Pak.).
19. Id. at 1762.
20. Id. at 1763.
21. Id. at 1768.
22. Id. at 1779.
23. Id. at 1765. According to the Court, allowing Ahmadis to perform their rituals
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In interpreting the phrase "subject to law" in Article 20 of
the Constitution, the Court rejected the distinction made by the
appellant between positive law and Islamic law.24 The Court
took the position that due to the incorporation of the Objectives
Resolution25 as a substantive part of the Constitution in 1985,26
injunctions of Islam as contained in the Qur'an and Sunnah are
adopted as "the real and the effective law," and "are now the
positive law."2 7  The Court claimed that due to this change
publicly would be "like permitting civil war." Id. at 1777. The Court assured that "[il t is
not a mere guesswork. It has happened, in fact many a time, in the past, and had been
checked at cost of colossal loss of life and property ... ." Id. at 1777-78. The Court
then invited the public to review the REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONSTITUTED
UNDER PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954 TO ENQUIRE INTO THE PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953
(1954) [hereinafter COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT]. In seeking support for its finding from
the COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT, the Zaheeruddin Court grossly misrepresented the find-
ings and conclusions of the Report. Compare COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT, supra, at 239-58
(finding anti-Ahmadi leaders responsible for law and order breakdown in 1962-53) with
Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S. Ct.) at 1777-78, (holding Ahmadis responsible for law and
order breakdown in 1952-53).
24. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1757-69 (Pak.). The Court referred exten-
sively to the case law of other common law jurisdictions to establish the validity of the
limits upon freedom of religion. Id. Among cases cited were: Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Hindu Religious
Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra, 1954 A.I.R. (S.Ct.) 282 (India); Hamilton v. Regents
of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Commonwealth v. Plisted, 148 Mass. 375
(1889). Id. at 1757-69. See also T.K. TOPE, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 224-236 (2d
ed. 1992) (discussing freedom of religion in India).
25. The Objectives Resolution, adopted in 1949 by the first Constituent Assembly
of Pakistan, was intended to provide guiding principles for the country's constitution.
See Mahmood, Constitutional Foundations, supra note 11, at 46 (providing text of reso-
lution). The resolution also represented a compromise between religious and secular
political forces, providing that "Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of Is-
lam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna." Id. The Resolution formed the
preamble of the three successive constitutions of the country.
26. In 1985, by virtue of the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, orches-
trated by the country's third martial law regime, the government designated the Resolu-
tion a "substantive part of the Constitution." See PA& CONST. (1973) art. 2-A. See also
Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Re-
sponses to Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REv. 1225, 1282-94 (1993)
(detailing context and nature of Eighth Amendment) [hereinafter Mahmud, Praetoian-
ism].
27. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1774 (Pak.). The Court considered mis-
placed the appellants' reliance on: Asma Jilani v. Gov't of the Punjab, 1972 P.L.D.
(S.Ct.) 139 (Pak.); Ali v. State, 1975 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 506 (Pak.); Pakistan v. United Sugar
Mills, Ltd., 1977 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 397 (Pak.); and Fauji Foundation v. Shamimur Rehman,
1983 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 457 (Pak.). Id. In all of these cases, the Court held that the Objec-
tives Resolution, which formed part of the preamble of the Constitution, was not a
supra-constitutional directive that could override other provisions of the Constitution.
1995] FREEDOM OF RELIGION AMD REIJGIOUS MINORITIES 49
" [t]he power of judicial review of the superior Courts also got
enhanced," 8 and "every man-made law must now conform to
the Injunctions of Islam as contained in Qur'an and Sunnah
.... Therefore, even the Fundamental Rights as given in the
Constitution must not violate the norms of Islam."29 The Court
went on to say:
Anything, in any fUndamental right, which violates the In-
junctions of Islam thus must be repugnant. It must be noted
here that the Injunctions of Islam, as contained in Qur'an
and the Sunnah, guarantee the rights of the minorities also in
such a satisfactory way that no other legal order can offerany-
thing equal.3"
The Court collapsed any distinction between state and pri-
vate acts when it designated the declaration of Ahmadis as non-
Muslims by the Constitution of Pakistan as an excommunica-
tion.3 1 The Court noted that "the right to oust dissidents has
been recognised, in favour of the main body of a religion or a
denomination, by the Courts." 2 The Court wondered why the
Ahmadis "do not... coin their own epithets etc.,"33 and then
Id. The Court relied instead on Pakistan v. Public at Large, 1987 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 304
(Pak.), and Pakistan v. N.W.F.P., 1990 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 1172 (Pak.), in which the Court
held that due to the incorporation of the Objectives Resolution into the substantive
part of the Constitution, legislation may be tested for repugnancy with the Qur'an and
Sunnah. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1774 (Pak.).
28. Id. at 1773.
29. Id. at 1775.
30. Id.; contra Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Muslim World: Socio-Polit-
ical Conditions and Scriptural Imperatives: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 13
(1990); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International Law in the Muslim
Context,. 9 WHIMsER L. REv. 491 (1987); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Civil Rights in the Islamic
Constitutional Tradition: Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 267
(1992); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Religious Minorities Under Islamic Law and the Limits of
CulturalRelativism, 9 HuM. RTs. Q. 1 (1987); ANN E. MAYER, ISLAM AND HumAN RIGHTS:
TRADITION AND POLITICS (1991) [hereinafter MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RICHTS].
31. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1768-70 (Pak.); see Kennedy, supra note 7, at
90-92 (discussing designation of Ahmadis as non-Muslims); ANwAR H. SYED, THE Dis-
COURSE AND POLTICS OF ZuLiKRx AL BHUTrO 199-200 (1992) [hereinafter SYED, Dis-
COURSE AND POLITICS OF BHUrTrO].
32. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1768 (Pak.). The Court cited the Indian
case of Sardar Syedna Taher Saifudin Sahib v. State of Bombay, 1962 A.I.R. (S.CL) 853
(India), and the Privy Council case of Hassanali v. Mansoorali, 1948 A.I.R. (P.C.) 66
(India), both of which concern the right of religious denominations to excommunicate
their members. Id.
33. Id. at 1754. The Court added:
Do not they realise that relying on the 'Shaairs' and other exclusive signs,
marks and practices of other religions will betray the hollowness of their own
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opined that it did "not think that the Ahmadis will face any diffi-
culty in coining new names, epithets, titles and descriptions for
their personages, places and practices."34
One should note the polemical tone of the judgment and
the Court's repeated use of rhetorical questions. For example,
the Court asked, "[c] an then anyone blame a Muslim if he loses
control of himsel [f] on hearing, reading or seeing such blasphe-
mous material as has been produced by Mirza Sahib?""5 The
Court painted the issue as one of law and order, and upheld
Ordinance XX on the ground that "if an Ahmadi is allowed by
the administration or the law to display or chant in public, the
Shaair-e-Islam', it is like creating a Rushdi' [sic] out of him. Can
the administration in that case guarantee his life, liberty and
property and if so at what cost?"36 The Government itself was
made a target of polemics with the observation that:
[I]n this Ideological State, the appellants, who are non-Mus-
lims want to pass off their faith as Islam [.] It must be appreci-
ated that in this part of the world, faith is still the most pre-
cious thing to a Muslim believer, and he will not tolerate a
Government which is not prepared to save him of such decep-
tions or forgeries.3 7
Zaheeruddin rests on several questionable and unsubstanti-
religion. It may mean in that event that their new religion cannot progress or
expand on its own strength, worth and merit but has to rely on deception.
Id.
34. Id. at 1779.
35. Id. at 1777. Mirza Sahib is a reference to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. See supra note
7 and accompanying text (discussing Ahmadi movement and role of Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad).
36. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1777 (Pak.). This reference is to Salman
Rushdie, author of the novel THE SATANIC VERSES (1988), and stems from the fact that
many mainstream Muslims protested publication of the work, which they considered
blasphemous. M.M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor, and Freedom of
Speech, 79 VA. L. REv. 153, 153-57 (1993). Rushdie was condemned to death by Iran's
supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, and a price was put on his head by zealous Irani-
ans. Id. at 154. These actions forced Rushdie to go into hiding under the protection of
British authorities, a situation that has continued for the last six years. Id. at 159. On
the Rushdie affair, see generally TIMOTHY BRENNAN, SALMAN RUSHDIE AND THE THIRD
WORLD: MYrHS OF THE NATION (1989); Akeel Bilgrami, Rushdie & The Reform of Islam, 8
GRAND STREET 170 (1989); Akeel Bilgrami, Rushdie, Islam and Postcolonial Defensiveness, 4
YALEJ. CIuTIcIsM 301 (1990); Talal Asad, Ethnography, Literature, and Politics: Some Read-
ings and Uses of Salman Rushdie's The Salamic Verses, 5 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 239
(1990).
37. Zaheenuddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1754 (Pak.).
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ated assumptions and propositions, some express and others im-
plied. These include: (i) Islamic law or Shari'ah is the supreme
law of the land, and all legislation, including the Constitution,
must yield to it; (ii) Islamic law is a self-evident and fixed norma-
tive code, one that can be deployed without any revision or de-
velopment to seek answers to all problems confronting a state in
modem times, including issues of constitutional governance and
fundamental individual rights; (iii) because of the incorporation
of the Objectives Resolution as a substantive part of the Constitu-
tion, much of the foundational jurisprudence of the Court re-
garding the freedom of religion stands overruled; (iv) the histor-
ical record of the independence movement and pronounce-
ments of the Founding Fathers of Pakistan about religious
freedom and the rights of religious minorities are not relevant to
a judicial resolution of the issue at hand; (v) in a Muslim-major-
ity state, no protection needs to be provided to religious beliefs
and practices which are out of step with, and offend, the major-
ity; and (vi) the dictates of international human rights law must
yield to the pronouncements of Islamic law and are thus irrele-
vant with respect to questions regarding the freedom of religion
in a Muslim state. These assumptions will now be examined in
light of the implied covenant between religious minorities and
the Pakistan Movement, Pakistan's foundational constitutional
jurisprudence, and international human rights law.
II. THE IMPLIED COVENANT BETWEEN RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES AND THE PAKISTAN MOVEMENT
The express guarantees for freedom of belief and practice
of religion, rule of law, due process, equal protection, and a pro-
gressive legislative agenda, proffered by the leadership of the
Pakistan Movement, constitute an implied social covenant with
religious minorities in Pakistan. Because this implied covenant
was expressly incorporated by the Founding Fathers into the
foundational legislative history of the country, the judiciary must
treat this covenant as a doctrinal determinant regarding the na-
ture and the scope of religious freedom for religious minorities
in Pakistan.
Before examining the above pronouncements by Pakistan's
Founding Fathers, it is important to note that they were issued
within the context of "the ideological schizophrenia permeating
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the Pakistan Movement."38 While the demand for the partition
of British India into two separate states was based upon the no-
tion that the Muslims of India constituted a distinct nation, and
religious rhetoric was often used to justify this demand, 9 the
leaders of the All India Muslim League ("AIML"), 4 ° who had
only tangential contact with religion, were influenced strongly by
secular liberal thought and often advocated the separation of
religion and politics.41 Historians note the "obvious contradic-
tion in the demand for a separate, but secular, Muslim State," 42
and posit that the movement for Pakistan "can be perfectly well
explained without reference to Islam, though not without refer-
ence to Muslims."43 Apart from the personal backgrounds and
worldviews of the AIML leadership, and the ambiguous distinc-
tions between an Islamic and a Muslim polity, two inescapable
considerations defined the AIML position regarding the rights
of religious minorities. First, Muslims themselves constituted a
religious minority in an undivided India. Even up to 1946, one
year before the partition of India, the AIML had not abandoned
38. OMAR NoMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN 1947-85, at 3 (1988)
[hereinafter NOMAN].
39. See SHAIF AL MUJAHID, QuAJD-I-AzAMJINNAH: STUDIES IN INTERPRETATION 236
(1981) (quoting Jinnah as saying "Islam is our guide and complete code of life");
KHALID B. SAYEED, PAKISTAN: THE FORMATIVE PHASE 1857-1948, at 202-06 (2d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter SAVEED, PAKISTAN] (discussing use of religious symbols and of religious and
spiritual leaders by AIML to influence electoral results); DAVID GILMARTIN, EMPIRE AND
ISLAM: PUNJAB AND THE MAKING OF PAKISTAN 169-73 (1988). Gilmartin notes thatJin-
nah had previously advocated the adoption of the Shariat Application Act of 1937 in
the Central legislative Council of India. Id. at 169-73. Admittedly, the author notes,
this was done within the context of the increasingly communal character of Indian
politics at the time. Id.
40. Formed in 1906, the AIML was the major political party that articulated the
political interests of Indian Muslims under British colonial rule, and that spearheaded
the drive to create a separate state of Pakistan constituting Muslim majority areas of
India. On the AIML, see genera//y SAYEED, PAKISTAN, supra note 39, at 176-219; FARzANA
SHAIKH, COMMUNITY AND CONSENSUS IN ISLAM: MUSLIM REPRESENTATION IN COLONIAL
INDIA, 1860-1947 (1989) [hereinafter SHAIKH, COMMUNITY AND CONSENSUS].
41. See HECTOR BOLITHo, JINNAH: CREATOR OF PAKISTAN (1954) [hereinafter
BOLITHO] (discussing secular and liberal worldview of AIML leader); STANLEY WOLPERT,
JINNAH OF PAKISTAN (1984) [hereinafter WOLPERTJINNAH] (discussing phases of secular
nationalist politics by AIML leaders); SAAD R. KHARI,JINNAH REINTERPRETED: THEJOUR-
NEY FROM INDIAN NATIONALISM To MUSLIM STATEHOOD (1995) (analizing shift from sec-
ular to communal politics by AIML leaders).
42. NOMAN, supra note 38, at 4.
43. BINDER, supra note 23, at 63; see generally Barbara Metcalf, The Case of Pakistan,
in RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE MODERN WORLD (Peter H. Merkl & Ninian Smart eds.,
1983).
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its quest for a constitutional structure that could accommodate
Muslim interests within a united India, a political context within
which the Muslims would remain a religious minority.' This ne-
cessitated constitutional guarantees for the protection of reli-
gion and other interests of religious minorities. Second, if India
were partitioned with Muslim majority areas constituting a sepa-
rate state, large numbers of Muslims would remain in Hindu ma-
jority areas. This required the AIML "to negotiate constitutional
safeguards for Muslim minorities in the rest of India in exchange
for those it would confer on the large non-Muslim populations
residing within the territories of the Muslim state."45
Guarantees of freedom of religious belief and practice were
issued by the AIML throughout the phase of the struggle for self-
rule in India.' As the British took their first serious steps toward
a new constitutional arrangement, following the work of the Si-
mon Commission in 1927,' 7 the AIML, in its first formal consti-
tutional proposals, included an express provision for religious
freedom and even demanded "a further guarantee in the consti-
tution that on communal matters no bill or resolution would be
considered or passed if a three-fourths majority of the members
of the community concerned were opposed to it."4" Again, when
Mohammad Ali Jinnah49 summarized the Muslim position on
proposed constitutional changes in his famous ,Fourteen Points,
44. See AyESHAJALAL, THE SOLE SPOKESMAN: JINNAH, THE MUSLIM LEAGUE AND THE
DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN 174-207 (1985) [hereinafterJALAL, SOLE SPOKESMAN] (discussing
Muslim League's acceptance of Cabinet Mission Plan, envisaging confederal India, in
1946); AyeshaJalal & Anil Seal, Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics Between the Wars,
15 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 415 (1981); SAYEED, PAKISTAN, supra note 39, at 134-48.
45. AYEsHAJALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARNISM IN SOUTH ASIA: A COMPARA-
TIVE AND HISToIcAL PERSPECTIVE 14 (1995) [hereinafter JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AU-
THORITARIANISM].
46. For a detailed discussion of the struggle for de-colonization and self-govern-
ance in India, see generally CHAUDHRI M. ALu, THE EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN (1967)
[hereinafter ALu, EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN]; STANLEY WOLPERT, A NEW HISTORY OF INDIA
(2d ed. 1982); and 1-12 CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA: THE
TRANSFER OF POWER 1942-47 (Nicholas Mansregh & Penderel Moon eds., 1970-83)
[hereinafter TRANSFER OF POWER].
47. See SAYEED, PAKISTAN, supra note 39, at 63-75 (detailing work of Simon Commis-
sion constituted by British Government to investigate India's constitutional problems
and make recommendations for future constitution).
48. Resolution Adopted at the 19th Annual Session at Calcutta, AIML (Dec. 1927),
quoted in SAYEED, PAKISTAN, supra note 39, at 65.
49. The leading voice of AIML who later became the first Governor-General of
Pakistan. See generay BouTHo, supra'note 41; JALAL, SoLE SPOKESMAN, supra note 44;
WOLPERT, JINNAH, supra note 41.
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point number seven provided that "[fMull religious liberty, i.e.,
liberty of belief, worship and observance, propaganda, associa-
tion and education shall be guaranteed to all communities."" °
The Presidential Address to the 22nd Annual Session of the
AIML, delivered in Delhi in December 1931, articulated the
AIML's position that "the Constitution should contain a clause
defining fundamental rights such as freedom of profession, prac-
tice and propagation of religion.... etc. and that it should de-
vise means whereby these matters may be fully safeguarded. This
is a matter with regard to which there can be no possible differ-
ence of opinion."51 The Resolution adopted by the 27th Annual
Session of the AIML at Lahore in March 1940, which, for the
first time, formally committed the AIML to the demand of in-
dependent states in the Muslim majority areas of India, con-
tained the provision that "adequate, effective and mandatory
safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for
minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of
their religious, cultural, economic, political, administrative and
other rights and interests in consultation with them."5 2 This lan-
guage was adopted as part of the express aims and objectives of
the Constitution and Rules of the AIML, at the 28th Annual Ses-
sion at Madras in April 1941.-3 In his Presidential Address to the
30th Annual Session at Delhi in April 1943, Jinnah acknowl-
edged that "minorities are entitled to get a definite assurance or
to ask, 'Where do we stand in the Pakistan that you visualize?'"
and took the position that:
[This] is an issue of giving a definite and clear assurance to
the minorities. We have done it. We have passed a resolution
that the minorities must be protected and ,safeguarded to the
fullest extent; and as I said before, any civilized Government
50. SPEECHES AND DocuMENTs ON THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1921-47, at 245-47
(Maurice Gwyer & A. Appadorai eds., 1957).
51. Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, Chairman of the AIML Reception Committee,
Address at the 22d Annual Session, AIML (Dec. 26-27, 1931), reprinted in II FOUNDA-
TIONS OF PAJUSTAN: ALL INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE DoCUMENTs 1906-1947, at 184 (S.
Sharifuddin Pirzada ed., 1970) [hereinafter Pirzada, FOUNDATIONS].
52. Constitution and Rules Adopted at the 27th Annual Session, AIML (Apr. 1940), re-
printed in Pirzada, FoUNDAMONS, supra note 51, at 341.
53. Constitution and Rules Adopted at the 28th Annual Session, AIML (Apr. 1941), re-
printed in Pirzada, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at 371-72.
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will do it and ought to do it.54
Equally unambiguous wasJinnah's position on the constitu-
tional framework and legislative agenda of Pakistan. At the an-
nual meeting of the AIML at Delhi in 1943, a section of the
members proposed that the AIML should declare that the
Qu'ran should form the basis Of the future constitution of Paki-
stan. A draft resolution to this effect was circulated. In his ad-
dress, Jinnah took strong exception to this move and declared:
The Constitution of Pakistan can only be framed by the millat
[nation] and the people. Prepare yourselves and see that you
frame a Constitution which is to your heart's desire. There is
a lot of misunderstanding. A lot of mischief is created. Is it
going to be an Islamic Government? Is it not begging the
question? Is it not a question of passing a vote of censure on
yourself? The Constitution and the Government will be what
the people will decide.55
In view of Jinnah's position, the Draft Resolution was not
moved. 6 As far back as 1920, in the aftermath of the Khilafat
movement, 57 Jinnah had denounced the participation of the
ulama (religious scholars and preachers) in politics as invidious,
and appealed for "the intellectual and reasonable section" of
Muslim opinion to regain the initiative." Tensions between the
ulama and Western-educated politicians like Jinnah demon-
strated "their fundamentally different orientation to politics." 59
Speaking to university students in February 1938, Jinnah de-
clared, "[w] hat the League has done is to set you free from the
reactionary elements of Muslims and to create the opinion that
those who play their selfish game are traitors. It has certainly
freed you from that undesirable element of Maulvis and Mau-
54. Mohammad A. Jinnah, Presidential Address to the 30th Annual Session, AIML
(Apr. 1943), reprinted in Pirzada, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at 425.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 440 n.2.
57. Muslim religious leaders of India led this movement, which was aimed at pre-
serving the institution of the Khaliphate, personified by the Sultan of Turkey, in the
aftermath of the First World War. See generally GAIL MINAULT, THE KHILAFAT MOvEMENT:
RELIGIOUS SYMBOUSM AND POLmCAL MOBILIZATION IN INDIA (1982). The subsequent
decision by the Turkish National Assembly to abolish the Khaliphate and institute a
Republic took the wind out of the movement's sails. Id.
58. Mohammad A. Jinnah, Address to the Nagpur Session of Congress (1920), in
M. H. SAnYD, MOHAMMAD ALIJINNAH: A PourmcAL STUDY 130 (1962). See also SHMrej,
supra note 40, at 182.
59. MINAULT, supra note 57, at 154.
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lanas [preachers and religious leaders]."6
On July 22, 1947, only three weeks before the partition of
India, the Partition Council, which included the top leadership
of both the Indian National Congress and the AIML, issued a
formal statement affirming that:
Both the Congress and the Muslim League have given assur-
ances of fair and equitable treatment to the minorities after
the transfer of power. The two future Governments re-affirm
these assurances. It is their intention to safeguard the legiti-
mate interests of all citizens irrespective of religion, caste or
sex. In the exercise of their normal civic rights all citizens will
be regarded as equal and both the Governments will assure to
all people within their territories the exercise of liberties such
as freedom of speech, the right to form associations, the right
to worship in their own way and the protection of their lan-
guage and culture.61
Most significant is the vision of religious freedom and sepa-
ration of religion and state presented byJinnah in his Presiden-
tial Address to the first session of Pakistan's Constituent Assem-
bly. As the foundation stone of the legislative history of Pakistan,
this address furnishes a yardstick to measure all subsequent legis-
lation, constitutional or otherwise.62 Jinnah called upon the as-
sembly to:
[R]emember that you are now a Sovereign Legislative body
and you have got all the powers.... You will no doubt agree
with me that the first duty of a Government is to maintain law
and order, so that the life property and religious beliefs of its
subjects are fully protected by the State .... If you change
your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you,
no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what re-
lations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his col-
our, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this
60. 1 SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF MR. JINNAH 43 (Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad ed., 7th ed.
1952).
61. 12 TRANSFER OF POWER, supra note 46, at 326.
62. The historic nature of the pronouncement was not lost on Jinnah, who
pointed out that:
The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform.. The first is
the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future Constitution of
Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete Sovereign body
as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan.
Mohammad A. Jinnah, Address to the First Meeting of the Constituent Assembly of
Pakistan (Aug. 11, 1947), in WOLPERT, JINNAH, supra note 41, at 337.
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State with equal rights, privileges and obligations, there will
be no end to the progress you will make.
I cannot emphasise it too much. We should begin to
work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities
of majority and minority communities, the Hindu community
and the Muslim community... will vanish.
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are
free to go to your mosques or any other place of worship in
this State of Pakistan.... You may belong to any religion or
caste or creed - that has nothing to do with the business of
the State . . . . We are starting in the days when there is no
discrimination, no distinction between one community and
another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and
another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that
we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State.63
Three days later, when Jinnah took the oath of office as Pak-
istan's first Governor-General before the Constituent Assembly,
the departing British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, sought assur-
ance of religious tolerance and non-discrimination.' Jinnah, in
response, referred to the long history of Muslim political and
religious tolerance of non-Muslims, and assured the continua-
63. Id. at 337-39. Commenting on the apparent gulf betweenJinnah's pronounce-
ment and the establishment of a new country based on religion, Chaudhri Muhammad
Ali, a lieutenant ofJinnah and later a prime minister of Pakistan, noted:
Pakistan came into existence not by conquest but as the result of a negotiated
agreement between the representatives of the Hindu and Muslim communi-
ties to partition the subcontinent. An explicit and integral part of the agree-
ment was that the minorities in both states would have equal rights and equal
protection of law. In that context the Quaid-i-Azam IJinnah] was wholly right
in asserting the fundamental principle that "we are all citizens and equal citi-
zens of one State." It follows that the state must give full protection to "the
life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects [and] should wholly and
solely concentrate on the well-being of the people and especially of the masses
and the poor." These practical tasks of statesmanship can be fulfilled only by
giving equal rights and equal responsibilities to all citizens.
AL, EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN, supra note 46, at 240.
64. Louis Mountbatten, Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Aug. 14,
1947), reprinted in SHAMEEM H. KADRi, CREATION OF PAKusTAN 501-04 (1983). Lord
Mounbatten stated that British trading with India started when:
[YMour great Emperor Akbar was on the throne, whose reign was marked by
perhaps as great a degree of political and religious tolerance, as has been
known before or since.... Akbar's tradition has not always been consistently
followed, by British or Indians, but I pray, for the world's sake, that we will
hold fast, in the years to come, to the principles that this great ruler taught us.
Id. at 504.
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tion of this practice.65 When Pakistan's first cabinet was formed,
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, a prominent Ahmadi and a former
president of the AIML, was appointed foreign minister.66
Collectively Jinnah's pronouncements add up to an une-
quivocal guarantee of religious freedom and practice, the sepa-
ration of religion from the affairs of State, and the unfettered
sovereignty of a representative legislature. A former Chief Jus-
tice of Pakistan, S. A. Rehman, takes the position that given Jin-
nah's repeated assurances to non-Muslim residents of Pakistan
that they Would enjoy all the fundamental rights guaranteed to
them on the basis of equality with members of the majority com-
munity, and that they could expect to receive generous rather
than merely egalitarian treatment, "It] heir position is assimilable
to that of mu'ahids - the beneficiaries of a binding pact."67
Having failed to sustain the thesis that Jinnah was an advo-
cate for the creation of an Islamic state, apologists for religious
orthodoxy and intolerance in Pakistan point out that:
Jinnah was a political leader and not a systematic thinker ....
For a brilliant and accomplished lawyer such as Jinnah was,
his academic grounding was rather inadequate.... Jinnah
could not work out a consistent theoretical framework of Pak-
istan. For one thing, his was not the role of a systematic theo-
retician, nor was he qualified for it.68
65. Id. at 505. Jinnah in response stated that: "The tolerance and goodwill that
the great Emperor Akbar showed to all the non-Muslims is not of recent origin.... The
whole history of Muslims, wherever they ruled, is replete with those humane and great
principles which should be followed and practised by us." Id.
66. ALI, EMERGENCE OF PAKISTAN, supra note 46, at 241. Even before the formation
of Pakistan, religious scholars and ulama had denounced the Ahmadis as heretics or
apostates. See Aziz Ahmad, Activism of the Ulama in Pakistan, in SCHOLARS, SAINTS, AND
SUnIS: MUSLIM RELGIOuS INSTITUTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1500, at 262 (Nikki R.
Keddie ed., 1972) [hereinafter Ahmad, Activism]. This did not stop the Muslim League
andJinnah from giving Ahmadis leading positions in the party and the movement. Id.
In February 1940, Zafulla Khan wrote a position paper with the approval ofJinnah and
the AIML, outlining desirable constitutional schemes for India after the departure of
the British. JALAL, SoLE SPOsKSAN, supra note 44, at 55-57. The ideas discussed in the
paper furnished the basic framework for the Lahore Resolution of March 1940, which
was adopted by the AIML. Id. Zafulla Khan was later selected by Jinnah to present
Pakistan's case before the Boundary Commission, established to demarcate the bound-
ary between India and Pakistan following partition in 1947. COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT,
supra note 23, at 197 (describing how Zafulla Khan later became judge and president of
International Court of Justice).
67. SA RAHMAN, PUNISHMENT OF APOSTASY IN ISLAM 2 (1972).
68. AL MUJAHID, supra note 39, at 230-32.
[Vol. 19:40
1995] FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 59
Any lack of "systematic theorizing" on Jinnah's part, how-
ever, was adequately compensated by the vision and elucidation
of Dr. Muhammad Iqbal,69 who advanced a comprehensive legis-
lative blueprint and agenda for the proposed state. Iqbal's first
clearly articulated call for separate Muslim states in the Muslim
majority areas of India, delivered in his Presidential Address to
the December 1930 session of the AIML, contained an assurance
to non-Muslims. After stating that "[a] community which is in-
spired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and
ignoble," he affirmed that "I entertain the highest respect for
the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other com-
munities."7" Iqbal then assured that "[n]or should the Hindus
fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean
the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states."7 '
Iqbal argued that:
[T]he formation of a consolidated Muslim state [is] in the
best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security
and peace resulting from an internal balance of power, for
Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian
Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its educa-
tion, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its
own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.7 2
As for the legislative agenda of the proposed State, Iqbal stated
that:
The claim of the present generation of Muslim Liberals to
reinterpret the foundational legal principles, in the light of
their own experience and the altered conditions of modern
life, is, in my opinion, perfectlyjustified. The teaching of the
Qur'an that life is a process of progressive creation necessi-
tates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the
work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own
69. Iqbal, a thinker, philosopher, and poet, is credited with originating the con-
cept of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India. Correspondence between Iqbal
and Jinnah furnishes a unique and intimate look into the former's philosophy and
agendas, as well as into the assumptions and postures of the two pivotal figures among
the leadership of Indian Muslims during the struggle for decolonization. See generally
QuAM-E-AzAM JINNAH'S CORRESPONDENCE (S. Sharifuddin Pirzada ed., 3d ed. 1977);
IQBAAL: POET-PHILOSOPHER OF PMAUSTAN (Hafeez Malik ed., 1971).
70. Pirzada, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 51, at 157.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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problems.73
In Iqbal's view, the revitalized institutionalization of ijtiha'd
would be the best vehicle for accomplishing this legislative
agenda.74 The first step in this process was the rejection of an
"intellectual attitude which has reduced the Law of Islam practi-
cally to a state of immobility."7  The second step was to recog-
nize that the representative elected legislature in a republic was
the appropriate forum for ijtiha'd.76 Thus, Iqbal's vision under-
stood ijtiha'd as a "complete authority in legislation," which had
traditionally been reserved for the founders of religious schools,
as opposed to "relative authority which is to be exercised within
the limits of a particular school, and.., special authority which
relates to the determining of the law applicable to a particular
case left undetermined by the founder."77 For Iqbal:
The essence of Tauhid [unity of God], as a working idea, is
equality, solidarity, and freedom. The state, from the Islamic
standpoint, is an endeavor to transform these ideal principles
into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a defi-
73. Id. at 234.
74. Ijtiha'd, which literally means striving or exerting, is part of the elaborate meth-
odology of law in Islamic principles ofjurisprudence (uSul a-fliqh). JOSEPH SCHCHT, AN
INTRODUCrION TO ISLAMIC LAw 70 (1964). The Qur'an and Sunnah are the primary
sources of law, supplemented by qeyas (reasoning by analogy) and ijma (consensus).
#Itihad is the exertion of mental faculties in the search for legal principles in areas
where the Qur'an and Sunnah may be silent, and to accommodate changes in the con-
text of application of settled principles. However, after the formative phase of Islamic
jurisprudence by about 900 A.D.:
T] he point had been reached when the scholars of all schools felt that all
essential questions had been thoroughly discussed and finally settled, and a
consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards
no one might be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent
reasoning in law, and that all future activity would have to be confined to the
explanation, application, and, at the most, interpretation of the doctrine as it
had been laid down once and for all.
Id. at 70-71. This development is designated as "the closing of the door of ijtihad,"
whereby the right of ijtihad was replaced by the duty of taqlid (conformity or imitation).
Id. at 71. Ever since, Islamic reformists have sought to reclaim the right of ijtihad and
have forwarded models of doing so. See generally Wael B. Hallaq, The Gate ofIjtihad: A
Study in Islamic Legal History (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wash-
ington); NOELJ. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISAMC LAw (1964); FAZLUR RANmAN, ISLAM
(1966); FAZLUR RAHMAN, ISLAM AND MODERNrIY. TRANSFORMATION OF AN INTELLECrUAL
TRADmON (1982).
75. MUHAMMAD IQBAL, RECONSTRUCTION OF RELIOUS THOUGHT IN ISLAM 188 (M.
Saeed Shaikh ed., 2d ed. 1989).
76. Id.
77. Id. (citations omitted).
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nite human organization. It is in this sense alone that the
state in Islam is a theocracy, not in the sense that it is headed
by a representative of God on Earth who can always screen his
despotic will behind his supposed infallibility.7 8
Iqbal took the unambiguous position that:
The transfer of the power of Ijtiha'd from individual repre-
sentatives of schools to a Muslim legislative assembly which, in
view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form
of Ijma' can take in modem times, will secure contributions
to legal discussion from laymen who happen to possess a keen
insight into affairs. In this way alone can we stir into activity
the dormant spirit of life in our legal system, and give it an
evolutionary outlook.79
Terming the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assem-
bly to abolish the institution of Khilafat an "exercise... [of] this
power of Ijtiha'd," Iqbal approved of the Turkish position of vest-
ing the Caliphate or Imamate in the elected Assembly." Iqbal
also believed that the republican form of government had be-
come a necessity in the Islamic World.8" For Iqbal, among the
Muslim nations, "Turkey alone has shaken off its dogmatic slum-
ber, and attained self-consciousness. She alone has claimed her
right of intellectual freedom; she alone has passed from the
ideal to the real - a transition which entails keen intellectual
and moral struggle."
12
These unambiguous pronouncements constitute an implied
covenant between religious minorities and the leadership of the
Pakistan movement. This covenant embodies several guarantees
for religious minorities: (i) that freedom of religion and opin-
ion will be guaranteed, and equal rights of citizenship will be
enjoyed by all, irrespective of religious beliefs; (ii) that the State
will have a republican form of government with a sovereign legis-
lature unencumbered by medieval formulations of Islamic law or
Shari'ah; and (iii) that the legislative agenda of a representative
78. Id. at 122-23.
79. Id. at 138.
80. Id. at 124-25.
81. Id. Iqbal also believed that "the Turkish view is perfectly sound.... The re-
publican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam,
but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of
Islam." Id.
82. Id. at 128.
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legislature will be to facilitate the development and growth of
society in tune with the modem world. The subsequent express
inclusion of these guarantees in the inaugural address to the
Constituent Assembly by the President of the body made the cov-
enant part of the foundational legislative history of Pakistan. As
such, the terms of this covenant must inform actions of both the
legislature and the judiciary. The Court's complete disregard of
these guarantees in Zaheeruddin, therefore, puts the Supreme
Court of Pakistan at odds with the vision that informed the very
establishment of Pakistan.
III. EVOLUTION OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION JURISPRUDENCE
IN PAKISTAN
When examining the evolution of the freedom of religion
jurisprudence in Pakistan, with particular reference to the
Ahmadi question, the contextual and doctrinal determinants of
judicial practice must be highlighted. The judicial practice in
question comprises three inconsistent models: (i) the princi-
pled and unequivocal protection of freedom of religion; (ii) the
curtailment of fundamental rights dictated by unwarranted judi-
cial deference to the legislative power to amend the Constitu-
tion; and (iii) the complete abdication of the judicial function of
safeguarding fundamental rights and capitulation to extra-con-
stitutional regimes and regressive religious pressure groups.
A. Phase I: Unequivocal Protection: 194 7-72
Pakistan's political and constitutional framework during the
first phase of its existence as an independent country furnished
the context within which the superior judiciary was able to fash-
ion a posture of robust protection of freedom of religion of reli-
gious minorities. On the eve of Pakistan's independence, the
extent to which religion would determine politics in the new
Muslim state remained unsettled."3 The ulama seized the oppor-
83. Commentators note that "there was no agreement among the guardians of the
faith or the managers of the state as to what should constitute the ideal of a socially
uniform doctrinally based cultural monolith called Islam." JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND Au-
THORrrARMANSM, supra note 45, at 220. This notion reflected the fact that:
Pakistan was truly a product of many imaginations, each with their own visions
of political community and state structure. The evolving state was caught be-
tween these images, the languages in which they were expressed, and the peo-
ple who articulated them. For some, Pakistan was the proud culmination of
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tunity to exert pressure on the secular rulers of the new country
by demanding the creation of a theocratic state. For Pakistan's
religious leadership, such demands were a logical corollary to
Pakistan's emergence as a separate homeland for India's Mus-
lims.,'
The Pakistan Muslim League leaders, however, had no in-
tention of conceding to the demands for a theocratic state. Nev-
ertheless they compromised to diffuse the issue and deny the
ulama a platform from which to mobilize mass support. This
compromise took the shape of the Objectives Resolution,
adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949.85 The Objectives
Resolution was a statement of intent regarding Pakistan's future
Constitution and contained a deliberately vague pledge to incor-
porate Islamic principles. It also envisaged, however, guaran-
teed fundamental rights, including: religious freedom and
rights of religious minorities, the rule of law, and an independ-
ent judiciary.8 6 On October 6, 1950, the Constituent Assembly
Muslim self-assertion, for others it was the expression of a necessarily Islamic
state; for some, it represented successful anti-colonial politics while for others
partition meant the failed prospect of a pluralistic, liberal India; for some,
independence was the logical outcome of subcontinental politics, for others it
was the product of manipulation or historical accident. The state's anteced-
ents, both real and ideal, influenced each attempt to set the strategic and
political limits that defined state sovereignty ....
PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PoLiTics IN PAIU-
STAN 35-36 (1995) [hereinafter NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE].
84. During the course of the movement for independence in India, most Islamic
religious parties, groups, and leaders opposed the creation of Pakistan as a separate
state. As soon as Pakistan came into existence, however, these very groups became con-
tenders for the political and ideological leadership of the state. See BINDER, supra note
23, at 137-42, 153-82. The views of the ulama regarding the form of the Islamic theo-
cratic state were summarized in a report of the Board of the Talimat-i-Islamia (Islamic
education) which advocated the model of the classic Muslim Caliphate. Id. at 115; see
also SAYVID ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, THE ISLAMIC LAW AND CONSTITUTION 355-59, 363-86
(Khurshid Abmad ed. and trans., 1960). A resolution adopted by a convention of
thirty-one ulama declared that the Constitution of Pakistan should incorporate princi-
ples of an Islamic state. Moreover, the ulama demanded that five ulama be appointed
to the Supreme Court to determine if any given law was repugnant to the Qur'an or
Sunnah. See generally ANWAR H. SYED, PAMSTAN: ISLAM, "POLrrIcs, AND NATIONAL Sou-
DAmrTy 63-68 (1982) [hereinafter SYED, PAKISTAN]; Wayne A. Wilcox, Ideological Dilemmas
in Pakistan's Political Culture, in SOUTH ASIAN PoLrrlcs AND REUGION (Donald E. Smith
ed., 1966); Farzana Shaikh, Islam and the Quest for Democracy in Pakistan, 24J. OF COM-
MONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 75 (1986).
85. See MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 46 (providing
complete text of Objectives Resolution).
86. Id. While moving to introduce the Resolution in the Assembly, Prime Minister
Liaquat Ali Khan reiterated that the Resolution did not imply a theocracy, declaring:
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adopted an interim report on fundamental rights for the citizens
of Pakistan, whereby every duly qualified citizen was declared eli-
gible to appointment in the service of the State, irrespective of
religion, race, caste, sex, descent, or place of birth, and every
citizen's right to freedom of conscience and to profess, practice,
and propagate religion was guaranteed. 7 Pakistan's first consti-
tution, adopted in 1956, guaranteed the fundamental rights of
all citizens to profess, practice, and propagate any religion."8
While the following years saw the rise and demise of constitu-
tional orders, 9 the ruling elites remained committed to reli-
gious freedom and the protection of religious minorities.90
"If there are any who still use the word theocracy in the same breadth as the polity of
Pakistan, they are either laboring under a grave misapprehension, or indulging in mis-
chievous propaganda." Id. at 47-48. The.Prime Minister continued: "In no way will
they [religious minorities] be hindered from professing or protecting their religion or
developing their cultures" Id. at 49. The author describes the debate that followed,
remarkable for its express assurance of freedom of religion and equal rights of all citi-
zens. See SYED, PAmsTAN, supra note 84, at 68-75. According to one scholar:
The Resolution's generality could not hide profound disagreements about the
character of the future constitution or state-for example, its characterization
of the role of Islam was made simultaneously prominent, obscure and legally
undefined. Its grounding power for constitution-writing has been emotional
rather than practical, inertial more than assertive.
NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE, supra note 83, at 22.
87. See MAHMOOD, CONSTrUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 239-42. On
September 7, 1954 the Constitutent Assembly adopted a report issued by the Commit-
tee on Fundamental Rights of Citizens of Pakistan and on Matters Relating to Minori-
ties, which further elaborated religious, cultural, and political rights of minorities. Id.
at 243-45 (providing text of report).
. 88. PAI. CONST. (1956) art. 18; see MAHMOOD, CONSTrrTUnONAL FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 11, at 247-32 (providing text of 1956 Constitution).
89. See Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1231-60; AyeshaJalal, The Politics
of a Constitutional Crisis: Pakistan, April 1953-May 1955, in CONs'rrurTioNAL HEADs AND
POLITICAL CRIsES: COMMONWEALTH EPISODES, 1945-85 (David A. Low ed., 1988); Mo-
HtAMMAn WASEEM, PoLMcS AND THE STATE IN PAKISTAN (1989) [hereinafter WASEEM];
AYEsHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN'S POLTICAL
ECONOMY OF DEFENCE (1990) [hereinafter JALAL, STATE OF MARTIAL RULE].
90. See NOMAN, supra note 38, at 8. After the deaths of the first-generation Muslim
League leaders, leadership of the country passed to the bureaucratic and military elites.
Id. Leaders' postures toward religious freedom are reflected in their statements. Gov-
ernor General Ghulam Mohammad declared, "Pakistan is a secular, democratic and not
a theocratic state." I President Iskander Mirza warned that "if the learned maulanas
[preachers] try to dabble in politics there will be trouble . . . religion and politics
should be kept apart otherwise there will be chaos." Id. Commentators acknowledge
that the military regime that ruled the country from 1958 through 1968 "was quite firm
in its resolve of not permitting a role for Islam in determining institutional develop-
ment or governmental policies.... The' tone of the regime remained distinctly secu-
lar." Id. at 34-35.
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It was in this political context that the superior courts fash-
ioned doctrines that provided unhesitating and unequivocal pro-
tection of freedom of religious beliefs. As early as 1952, the
Chief Court of Sind held that:
[I] t is well-settled law, and one of the fundamental principle
[sic] of the Muhammadan Law itself, that no Court can test
or guage [sic] the sincerity of religious belief, and in order to
hold that a person was Sunni Muslim, it was sufficient for a
Court to be satisfied that he professed to be a Sunni Muslim.
It is not permissible to [sic] any Court to enquire further into
the state of the mind and the beliefs of a person who pro-
fessed to belong to a particular faith and inquire whether his
actual beliefs conformed to the orthodox tenets of that partic-
ular faith .... 91
It was in the context of the struggle between the ulama and
the leadership of the Muslim League over the role of religion in
politics, that the first anti-Ahmadi agitation, spearheaded by the
ulama, unfolded.9" The agitation started in 1952, when an All
Pakistan Muslim Parties Convention was convened at the initia-
tive of some ulama.93 The Convention demanded that: the
Ahmadis be declared a non-Muslim minority community; that
Zafrulla Khan, an Ahmadi, be removed from the office of For-
eign Minister; and that Ahmadis be removed from all key posi-
tions in government.9" The Convention appointed a Council of
Action, consisting of many prominent ulama, to issue an ultima-
tum to the Government to accept the anti-Ahmadi demands, and
demanded the resignation of the Prime Minister, who had re-
fused to dismiss Zafrulla Khan.95 The Government, however, re-
jected this ultimatum,96 arrested some of the ulama, and im-
posed martial law in Lahore, where the Provincial Government
had connived at the religious disturbances and tried to channel
them against the Central Government, imposed martial law. 97
The anti-Ahmadi agitation was thoroughly crushed and a Court
91. Moula Bux v. Charuk, 1952 P.L.D. (Sind) 54, 56 (Pak.).
92. See generally BINDER, supra note 23, at 259-96; Ahmad, Activism, supra note 66, at
257-65; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 84-88.
93. Ahmad, Activism, supra note 66, at 262.
94. COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 77.
95. Ahmad, Activism, supra note 66, at 263.
96.. COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 1.
97. Id.
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of Inquiry was constituted to investigate the disturbances.9" The
Court of Inquiry's terms of reference were: (i) the responsibility
for the disturbances; (ii) the circumstances leading to the decla-
ration of martial law; and (iii) the adequacy or inadequacy of the
measures taken by the civil administration to prevent, and subse-
quently, to deal with, the disturbances.99
The 387-page Report of the Court of Inquiry, based on' a
record consisting of 3600 pages of written statements and 2700
pages of evidence, is a document striking in its scope, tone, and
conclusions. The Court of Inquiry was firm in its view that "it is
not our business to give a finding whether the Ahmadis are or
are not within the pale of Islam."' Highlighting the open-tex-
tured and indeterminate nature of Islamic law, the Court of In-
quiry found that this would be an impossible task because "no
two ulama have agreed before us as to the definition of a Mus-
lim."1"' Due to the narrow sectarian definitions of who is a Mus-
lim proffered before it, the Court of Inquiry concluded that:
The net result of all this is that n[ei] ther Shias nor Sunnis nor
Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims and any
change from one view to the other must be accompanied in
an Islamic State with the penalty of death if the Government
of the State is in the hands of the party which considers the
other party to be kafirs [infidels]." °
The Court of Inquiry then undertook a detailed survey of
Jinnah's pronouncements regarding freedom of religion, rights
of minorities, and the separation of religion and politics, and
concluded thatJinnah's vision was of a nation in which religion
was "to have nothing to do with the business of the State and
[was] to be merely a matter of personal faith for the Individ-
98. See generally BINDER, supra note 23, at 259-96. Members of the Court of Inquiry
included Justice Muhammad Munir (later Chief Justice of Pakistan) and Justice M. R.
Kayani (later ChiefJustice of West Pakistan High Court).
99. COURT OF INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 23, at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 219. Spokesmen of some sects testified that, in their view, members of
certain other sects were not Muslims. Id. Noting that most ulama regarded death as the
appropriate penalty for apostasy, and considering that the followers of many sects
viewed others as heretics, the Court expressed great anxiety concerning the prospect of
civil peace in Pakistan if it became an Islamic state. Id. at 218-20.
102. Id. The proper nouns indicated in the context refer to different doctrinal
sects within Islam..
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ual."03 The ulama took the position thatJinnah's conception of
a modern state, where "[t]he future subject of the State is to be a
citizen with equal rights, privileges and obligations, irrespective
of colour caste, creed or community . . . became obsolete with
the passing of the Objectives Resolution." °4 The Court of In-
quiry, which found the ulama's response toJinnah's conception
of the state "unhesitating [ly] negative,"105 concluded however,
that the Objectives Resolution, "though grandiloquent in words,
phrases and clauses, is nothing but a hoax and that not only does
it not contain even a semblance of the embryo of an Islamic
State but its provisions, particularly those relating to fundamen-
tal rights, are directly opposed to the principles of an Islamic
State.' 06
The Court of Inquiry determined that "[r]esponsibility for
the disturbances must primarily rest on the members of ... the
numerous religious organisations."10 7  The Court of Inquiry
noted that the leading forces of the anti-Ahmadi movement had
opposed the creation of Pakistan, and that "Islam with them was
a weapon which they could drop and pick up at pleasure to dis-
103. Id. at 203.
104. Id. Spokesman of the Jama't-i-Islami described Jinnah's vision of a demo-
cratic polity as a "creature of the devil." Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Court of Inquiry took the position that
ITihe authors of that Resolution misused the words 'sovereign' and 'democ-
racy' when they recited that the Constitution to be framed was for a sovereign
State in which principles of democracy as enunciated by Islam shall be fully
observed .... When it is said that a country is sovereign, the implication is that
its people... are entitled to conduct the affairs of that country in any way they
like .... An Islamic State, however, cannot in this sense be sovereign, because
it will not be competent to abrogate, repeal or do away with any law in the
Qur'an or the sunna. Absolute restriction on the legislative power of a State is
a restriction on the sovereignty of the people of that State and if the origin of
this restriction lies elsewhere than in the will of the people, then to the extent
of that restriction the sovereignty of the State and its people is necessarily
taken away.
Id. at 210.
107. Id. at 239. The Court of Inquiry took the view that when the Majlis-i-Amal
[Action Committee] of the religious organizations decided to serve the government
with an ultimatum, they:
[K]new that if the demands were rejected and the threat of direct action was
put into execution, large-scale disturbances involving firing, bloodshed and
general disorder of a very serious character would be the result, and since the
events precisely took the anticipated course, the responsibility for the distur-
bances directly lies on the members of that Majlis.
Id. at 241.
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comfit a political adversary."108 The most perceptive of the
Court of Inquiry's findings was that the anti-Ahmadi movement
was an instrument whereby religious groups and leaders who
lacked popular support and secure political constituencies "were
'trying to capture a political living space' for themselves." 10 9 The
Court of Inquiry noted that religious groups had started the agi-
tation with a "political motive,"110 and had "purposely chosen an
issue on which nobody would have the courage to oppose
them."1 Besides Muslim religious groups, the Court of Inquiry
assigned responsibility to some factions of the Pakistan Muslim
League, particularly the provincial leadership in the Punjab,
who, the Court of Inquiry concluded, had jumped on the anti-
Ahmadi bandwagon in order to gain political advantage in its
power struggle with the Central Government. 12
The Court of Inquiry then focused on the evolution of the
human rights principles in international law, whereby "every per-
son shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion, including the freedom to change one's religion or be-
lief and to manifest such religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance."'1l The Court of Inquiry foresaw nega-
tive repercussions for Pakistan's standing in the international
community if the anti-Ahmadi demands were acceded to," 4 and
thought Pakistan risked being "ostracised from International So-
108. Id. at 254.
109. Id. at 257.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 258.
112. Id. at 261-80.
113. Id. at 233. The Court of Inquiry specifically referred to Article 13 of the Draft
International Covenant on Human Rights, which was prepared by a Commission on
Human Rights appointed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Id.
114. Id. The Court of Inquiry noted:
The acceptance of the demands would, therefore, have created a flutter in
international dovecotes and the attention of the international world would
have been drawn in one way or another to what was happening in Pakistan,
because the acceptance of the demands would have amounted to a public
commitment that Pakistan was basing its citizenship on grounds basically dif-
ferent from those observed by other nations and that non-Muslims were debar-
red from holding public offices in Pakistan merely for their religious beliefs.
Id. The Court of Inquiry also noted the agreement concluded between India and Paki-
stan on April 8, 1950, whereby both Governments guaranteed members of minorities
equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public
life of their country, to hold political or other offices, and to serve in their countries'
civil and armed forces. Id. at 234. The agreement recognized these rights as funda-
mental. Id.
[Vol. 19:40
1995] FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 69
ciety."115
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Pakistan had its first oppor-
tunity to directly rule on the nature and scope of religious free-
dom as enunciated in Article 18 of the Pakistan Constitution of
1956.116 Adopting a model of robust protection of basic rights,
the Court rejected the argument that because fundamental
rights are made "subject to law," they may be taken away by legis-
lation:
The very conception of a fundamental right is that it being a
right guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be taken away by
the law, and it is not only technically inartistic but a fraud on
the citizens for the makers of a Constitution to say that a right
is fundamental but that it may be taken away by the law. I am
unable to attribute any such intent to the makers of the Con-
stitution who in their anxiety to regulate the lives of the Mus-
lims of Pakistan in accordance with the Holy Quran and Sun-
nah could not possibly have intended to empower the legisla-
ture to take away from the Muslims the right to profess,
practise and propagate their religion and to establish, main-
tain, and manage their religious institutions, and who in their
conception of the ideal of a free, tolerant and democratic so-
ciety could not have denied a similar right to the non-Muslim
citizens of the State. . . I refuse to be a party to any such
pedantic, technical and narrow construction of the Article in
question, for I consider it to be a fundamental canon of con-
struction that a Constitution should receive a liberal interpre-
tation in favour of the citizen, especially with respect to those
provisions which were designed to safeguard the freedom of
conscience and worship. 117
115. Id. at 282.
116. The language of Article 18 of the Pakistan Constitution of 1956 is identical to
that of Article 20 of the Pakistan Constitution of 1973. See PAL. CONST. (1956) art. 18.;
PM(. CONST. (1973) art. 20.
117. Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhury v. East Pakistan, 1957 P.L.D. (S.Ct.)
9, 41-42 (Pak.). The Supreme Court noted that:
Consistently with the language used, constitutional instruments should receive
a broader and more liberal construction than statutes, for the power dealt with
in the former case is original and unlimited and in the latter case limited, and
constitutional rights should not be permitted to be nullified or evaded by as-
tute verbal criticism, without regard to the fundamental aim and object of the
instrument and the principles on which it is based.
fibendra Kishore, 1957 P.LD. (S.Ct.) at 42. The restrictive construction of the clause
"subject to law" was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in East & West Steamship Co. v.
Pakistan, 1958 P.L.D (S.Ct.) 41 (Pak.).
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While the Supreme Court recognized that law may regulate
the manner in which religion is to be professed, practiced, and
propagated, and religious institutions are to be established,
maintained, and managed, it insisted that the term "subject to
law" "cannot and do[es] not mean that such institutions may be
abolished altogether by the Law." l"'
Following the coup d'6tat in 1958, the Constitution of 1956
was abrogated. The new Constitution of 1962 initially omitted
fundamental rights. However, the First Amendment Act of 1964,
reinstated the fundamental rights, including freedom of reli-
gion, identical to the ones in the Constitution of 1956.119 In
1969, the Lahore High Court enforced this constitutional guar-
antee by specifically rejecting the right of anybody to call
Ahmadis non-Muslim, and held that there were no grounds for
either a declaration that the Ahmadis are non-Muslims or for an
injunction against Ahmadis calling themselves Muslims.1 20 Re-
sponding-to petitioners' argument that freedom of religion pro-
tects their right to call Ahmadis non-Muslims, the Court pointed
out that this:
[O]verlooks the fact that Ahmadis as citizens of Pakistan are
also guaranteed by the Constitution the same freedom to pro-
fess and proclaim that they are within the fold of Islam. How
can the petitioners deny to others what they claim for them-
selves is beyond our comprehension? Certainly not by ter-
rorising them. 121
The Lahore High Court surveyed a wide range of primary
and secondary sources of Islamic law, quoted relevant passages
from the Qur'an, and concluded that "[flreedom of thought
and conscience could not have been guaranteed in clearer
terms."1 2 2 The Lahore High Court designated instances of dub-
bing Ahmadis as apostates and of violence against them as "sad
instances of religious persecution against which human con-
science must revolt, if any decency is left in human affairs. "121
The first phase of judicial practice regarding the religious
118. Jibendra Kishore, 1957 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) at 42 (Pak.).
119. See MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTMONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 628 (provid-
ing text of First Amendment Act No. 1 of 1964).
120. Shorish Kashmiri v. West Pakistan, 1969 P.L.D. (Lah.) 289 (Pak.).
121. Shorish Kashmimi, 1969 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 307 (Pak.).
122. Id. at 309.
123. Id. at 308.
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rights of religious minorities, clearly, was one of unequivocal
protection. The language of the Pakistan Constitutions of 1956
and 1962 were relied upon as the primary doctrinal determi-
nants. An implied covenant between the Founding Fathers of
Pakistan and religious minorities was posited and adopted as
persuasive authority. International codes of freedom of religion
were deemed relevant and binding. Indeterminacy and inconsis-
tency in authoritative texts of Islamic law regarding rights of reli-
gious minorities was acknowledged, and such selections were ap-
propriated which envisaged broad protection. These judicial
pronouncements were proffered within a political context where
the dominant political forces were secular, where such forces
wanted to keep the voices of Islamic fundamentalism at bay, and
where the protection of religious minorities was considered a
natural part of constitutional governance.
B. Phase II: Deference to Constitutional Amendment and Contraction
of Protection
The establishment of the Fourth Republic with the adop-
tion of the Pakistan Constitution furnishes the context of the
second phase. 124  Designated by commentators alternately as
"[a]uthoritarian populism 1 25 and "politics of egalitarian re-
form,"126 this phase unfolded in the aftermath of the country's
first free election in 1970, in which parties intent on establishing
an Islamic state were electorally decimated. 2 7 The leader of the
newly elected government, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, described as an
"ideological schizophrenic,"1 2 and a "power craftsman," 129 pro-
124. See Kamal Azfar, Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan, in PAKiSTAN UNDER THE
MILTARY. ELEVEN YEARS OF ZIA UL-HAQ 50, 64-70 (ShahidJ. Burki & Craig Baxter eds.,
1991) (providing detailed account of constitutional order of Fourth Republic); Fazlur
Rahman, Islam and the New Constitution of Pakistan, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF PAM-
STAN 30 U. Henry Korson ed., 1974) (explaining 1973 Constitution's treatment of Is-
lam).
-125. NoMAN, supra note 38, at 55; seeJAL.AL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANIsM,
supra note 45, at 77-85 (providing perceptive analysis of structural determinants and
nature of populism in Pakistan during Fourth Republic).
126. WASEEM, supra note 89, at 297.
127. See SYED, PA KsTAN, supra note 84, at 116-23 (comparing candidates' election
platforms and results of 1970 elections); WASEEM, supra note 89, at 255-66 (analyzing
1970 elections in detail).
128. NomAN, supra note 38, at 105. On Bhutto, see generally SALMAAN TASEER,
BHUrro, A POLmcAL BIoGRAPh'l (1980); PILLo MODY, ZuLFi, My FRIEND (1973); SHAMID
JAvED Buiuu, PAKISrAN UNDER BHurro, 1971-1977 (2d ed. 1988). One biographer
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ceeded to establish "hegemony over a single-party dominated ci-
vilian structure, rather than developing a democratic par-
ticipatory framework...."'s The road to such hegemony lay
through the contraction of civil and political rights and the un-
dermining of the federal system."' To offset the resulting rapid
decline in the support for the Government among progressive,
secular, and democratic forces, there was an effort to reintro-
duce religion as a source of political legitimacy and a series of
concessions were made to placate conservative forces, including
the ulama.13 2
It was in this context, in 1974, that the ulama initiated a sec-
ond wave of anti-Ahmadi agitation. The ulama raised demands
similar to those raised in 1952,' a3 namely, the declaration of
Ahmadis as a non-Muslim minority and removal of Ahmadis
from all key governmental positions.'14 The Government ini-
tially treated the issue as one of law and order, and appointed a
respected judge of the Lahore High Court to investigate the mat-
ter and submit his findings. 135 The Government also sought to
discredit the leaders of the anti-Ahmadi agitations, charging
them with attempting to sabotage the unanimously adopted
1973 Constitution. The Government opposed Parliament's dis-
cussion of the question until after public order was restored and
speaks of Bhutto's "schizoid personality." STANLEY WOLPERT, ZULFI BHUTTO OF PAYO-
STAN: HIs LIFE AND TIMES 3 (1993) [hereinafter WOLPERT, ZuLFi BHUTTO].
129. NOMAN, supra note 38, at 105 (quoting Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan People's
Party (1979)) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics).
130. Id. at 107.
131. See Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1261-73; NoMAN, supra note 38,
at 101-07; WASEEM, supra note 89, at 323-40.
132. See NoMAN, supra note 38, at 107-11; SYED, PAKISTAN, supra note 84, at 126-30.
133. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing unfolding, of first
anti-Ahmadi agitation, which was spearheaded by ulama).
134. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 90-91'
135. ANWAR H. SYED, THE DISCOURSE AND POLITICS OF ZuLFIAR AL BHUTTO 198
(1992) [hereinafter SYED, BHUTTO]. The provincial chief executive specifically asked
the people not to make this breach of public order into a sectarian issue. Interestingly,
the judge appointed to investigate the matter, Lahore High Court Justice K.M.A.
Samdani, is of the view that:
[M]ost of the confusion that has arisen in the country as a result of which the
institution of democracy has suffered almost irreparably, stemmed from the
fact that by and large the judiciary in Pakistan tried, in times of crises, to avoid
confrontation with the executive and went out of its way to take the path of
least resistance. It [chose to] uphold the de facto situation rather than de-
clare the de jure position.
NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE, supra note 83, at 7.
[Vol. 19:40
1995] FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS MTNORITIES 73
the Inquiry Commission submitted its report, and pledged to
protect all citizens, regardless of their religious affiliation, with
all available means, including the army." 6 The opposition, how-
ever, raised the ante. They boycotted Parliament, formed an
"Action Committee," and decided to take "direct action" against
the Ahmadis starting June 14, 1974.137 Prime Minister Bhutto
capitulated and, after meeting the agitation leaders, agreed on
June 13 to place the issue before Parliament.13  On September
10, 1974, Parliament adopted a bill whereby the Constitution was
amended to provide that:
A person who does not believe in the absolute and unquali-
fied finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be
upon him) the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet,
in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever,
after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a
claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim
for the purposes of the Constitution or law.'
3 9
Commentators have accurately identified this development
among the "series of cynical concessions [made] to the religious
lobby in the hope of stealing their thunder," and one which
proved "[b]y far the most detrimental for the future of equal
citizenship rights.""
Apparently, not satisfied with the classification of Ahmadis
136. SYED, BHUrO, supra note 135, at 199; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 90.
137. SYED, BHUTrO, supra note 135, at 199-200; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 91.
138. SYED, BHutrro, supra note 135, at 190-201. Bhutto's capitulation was moti-
vated by the fear that "if the issue lingered, many PPP legislators in the Assembly might
bend before public pressure, support the ulema's demands, and in effect abandon
[him]." Id. at 201. The author notes that "Bhutto had responded to his political needs
... [and] he put aside his own intellectual inclination and preferences to heed' the
logic of political survival." Id.; see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 90 (noting that "[Bhutto's
actions] served to silence his critics and to buttress the sagging fortunes of his adminis-
tration"). The author also comments that "Islamic fundamentalists now had gained
greater power inside both Bhutto's government and party," and that the government's
reversal of public posture "encouraged immoderate expectations on the part of anti-
Ahmadi elements ... . [and] prompted officials to enthusiastically implement public
sanctions against the Ahmadiyya." Id. at 92; see also WOLPERT, ZULFi BHUTrO, supra
note 128, at 239. According to Bhutto's biographer, the passage of the amendment was
"a major victory for Prime Minister Bhutto because many thitherto [sic] anti-PPP funda-
mentalists crossed over the assembly lobbies.., to join what they now considered the
more 'orthodox' People's Party." Id.
139. CONSTITUTION (SECOND AMENDMENT) ACT, § 3 (Sept. 1974) (Pak.).
140. JALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 45, at 238. Jalal charac-
terizes this development as "unlocking the floodgates to the Islamic storm of the
1980s." Id.
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as non-Muslims, in 1976, a group of ulama brought a suit seeking
an injunction against the Ahmadis that would prohibit them
from calling their places of worship masjid, calling the azan, per-
forming namaz, and reciting the Qur'an.141 The Lahore High
Court denied the petition and held that:
It is the policy of the State to protect all religions but to inter-
fere with none.... [T]he right of conscience, i.e., the right
of individual members of a community to hold certain reli-
gious beliefs and opinion is of course a religious one and one
that cannot be called in question or adjudicated upon in the
civil Court.1 42
The Lahore High Court recited "the fundamental principle of
there being no compulsion in religious affairs .... It is not the
province or duty of the Court to pronounce on the truth of reli-
gious tenets or to regulate religious rites or ceremonies. 14 The
Lahore High Court held that "every one has a right to follow the
religion of his own liking and is at liberty to worship according
to the dictates of his own conscience without being guided or
governed in this respect by persons following a different reli-
gion."144 In rejecting the ulama's petition, the Lahore High
Court surveyed sources of Islamic law and concluded:
It is not difficult to infer from these authorities that Islam
leaves non-Muslims free to profess and practise their religion
and enjoy complete autonomy in regard to their religious ten-
ets and institutions.... I have not come across a single in-
stance in the Islamic history when the non-Muslim subjects
... have been subjected to religious intolerance or their free-
dom to practise their religions has ever been curtailed or in-
terfered with.145
The Lahore High Court rejected the argument that the
"subject to law" limitation of Article 20 meant Islamic law."4 It
141. Mobashir v. Bokhari, 1978 P.L.D. (Lah.) 113 (Pak.).
142. Mobashir, 1978 P.L.D. (Lah.) at 142 (Pak.).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 146.
145. Id. at 185.
146. Id. at 155. According to the Court:
The implication is clear that Shariat Law except what is already made applica-
ble by positive law is not included in the word law ... The argument that law
means Islamic Law and in case of conflict between Islamic Law and codified
law, the Islamic Law prevails, is thus easily refuted ....
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nevertheless engaged in an extensive review of primary religious
texts and commentaries of jurists, and adopted those pro-
nouncements which supported freedom of religious belief and
practice. 14 7 The Lahore High Court concluded that granting
the injunction against the Ahmadis "will amount to interfering
with their religion, which Islam, the religion of tolerance, does
not allow .... Islam leaves the non-Muslims free to profess and
practice their religion."148
While protecting the right of Ahmadis to practice their reli-
gion, the Lahore High Court did not question the validity of the
Second Amendment, which it termed "a declaratory statute
which by its very nature is retrospective in character."1 49 That
this recognition was a dictate of legal formalism and not rational
reasoning is betrayed by the Lahore High Court's tongue-in-
cheek remark that "[i] t is true that Legislature can pass any law
and can declare even a man as a woman or conversely a woman
as a man."1 50 Furthermore, as a pointed reminder that the
designation of Ahmadis as non-Muslims was the product of
amoral power politics, the Lahore High Court observed that "[a]
number of denominations were treated as infidels during the
course of [Muslim] history by the then monarch or Caliph."'
On the question of the validity of the Second Amendment,
the Lahore High Court was obliged to follow the position of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had rejected the proposition
that the theory of unfettered legislative power has no place
under a written federal constitution and that the federal legisla-
ture cannot employ its power to amend, abrogate, or destroy the
"basic structure" and "essential features" of the Constitution.15
The Supreme Court of Pakistan, in State v. Zia-ur-Rahman,151 a
case unrelated to the Ahmadi issue, had held that as long as the
147. Id. at 168-88.
148. Id. at 188. To overrule the Lahore High Court's holding in Mobashir, section
2 of Ordinance XX expressly provided that "provisions of this Ordinance shall have
effect notwithstanding any order or decision of any Court." Ordinance XX of 1984, 36
P.L.D. at 102 (Pak.). The implied reference to Mobashir was noted by the minority
opinion in Zaheeruddin. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1746 (Pak.). Justice Shafiur
Rahman, however, noted that, "[n]evertheless it must be stated that it is a very exhaus-
tive and illuminative judgment on the subject." Id.
149. Mobashir, 1978 P.L.D. (Lab.) at 151 (Pak.).
150. Id. at 154.
151. Id. at 170.
152. See generaly Mahmud, Praetoriansim, supra note 26, at 1262-73.
153. State v. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.LD. (S.Ct.) 49 (Pak.).
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procedure to amend the Constitution was followed, the judiciary
cannot question the substance of an amendment'54 which the
Court designated a nonjusticiable political question.155 Conse-
quently, during the second phase of judicial practice regarding
freedom of religion the superior courts of Pakistan retreated
from their position of unequivocal protection of freedom of reli-
gion of religious minorities, in deference to the constitutional
amendment process, when they validated the constitutional
designation of Ahmadis as non-Muslims. The courts remained
silent about the implied covenant guaranteeing the freedom of
religion to religious minorities and international human rights
norms. Nevertheless, they acknowledged the discontinuous and
contingent practice of historical Muslim political systems regard-
ing religious minorities, and chose to highlight those pro-
nouncements of primary religious texts that afford freedom of
religious belief and practice.
C. Phase H1: Complete Judicial Capitulation
The third phase ofjudicial conduct regarding religious free-
dom and religious minorities unfolded in the context of the in-
stitutionalization of praetorianism 156 and "Islamization" 157 of so-
ciety and politics under the martial law regime of General Zia-ul-
Haq,'58 whereby "[t] he military wrapped itself into the role of an
ideological vanguard for a theocratic state. 1 59 Claiming a divine
154. Zia-ur-Rahman, 1973 P.L.D. (S.CL) at 70 (Pak.).
155. Id. at 76-77.
156. See Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1282-94 (examining constitu-
tional issues surrounding establishment of martial law regime and its efforts to institu-
tionalize praetorianism).
157. See generally RASHIDA PATEL, ISLAMISATION OF LAWS IN PAKISTAN? (1986); RUBYA
MEHDI, THE ISLAMIZATION OF THE LAW IN PAKISTAN (1994); Ann E. Mayer, TheFundamen-
to.list Impact on Law, Politics, and Constitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan, in FUNDA-
MENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING PoLrIEs, ECONOMIES, AND MILITANCE 110 (Mar-.
tin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993); Lucy Carroll, Nizam-I-Islam: Processes and
Conflicts in Pakistan's Programme of Islamisation, with Special Reference to the Position of Wo-
men, 20J. COMMONWEALTH & COMP. POL. 57 (1982); Daniel P. Collins, Note, Islamization
of Pakistani Law: A Historical Perspecive, 24 STAN. J. INT'L L. 511 (1988); David Taylor,
The Politics of Islam and Islamization in Pakistan, in ISLAM IN ThE POLITICAL PROCESS 181
(James P. Piscatori ed., 1983); IsLAMIc REASSERTION IN PAKISTAN: THE APPUICATION OF
ISAMIC LAWS IN A MODERN STATE (Anita M. Weiss ed., 1986); IsLAM, POLTncs AND THE
STATE: THE PAKISTAN EXPERIENCE (Mohammad A. Khan ed., 1985).
158. See generalyJALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AuTHORITARIANISM, supra note 45, at 100-,
21.
159. NoMAN, supra note 38, at 117.
1995] FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 77
mandate, t °6 the military regime proceeded to reorder all aspects
of public and private life in line with a fundamentalist concep-
tion of an Islamic state. 161 Thejudicial system furnished a partic-
ularly fertile ground for "Islamization." Salient changes in-
cluded the introduction of the hudood penal code, 162 curtailment
of the scope of judicial review,163 dismantling of the tenurial sys-
tem of the superior judiciary," establishment of military
courts, 65 and establishment of Shari'at courts. 166 The changes
made under the rubric of "Islamization:"
[D]id much to eliminate due process, to erode the indepen-
dence of the judiciary, to place legal proceedings under the
control of political leaders, and to convert courts into instru-
ments of repression and intimidation.16
7
It was in this context that a third round of anti-Ahmadi agi-
tation unfolded. A resurgent Tehrik i-Khatm-i-Nabuwat [end of
prophethood movement] raised new demands of sanctions
against the Ahmadis,168 announced plans for an All-Pakistan
Conference to be held on April 27, 1984, and issued a warning
that if the demands were not met, "direct action" would be
160. General Zia, in an interview with the British Broadcasting Corporation on
April 15, 1978, commented, "I have a mission; given by God, to bring Islamic order to
Pakistan." Interview with Zial-ul-Haq, British Broadcasting Corporation (Apr. 15,
1978), reprinted in NoMAN, supra note 38, at 141.
161. NomAN, supra note 38, at 140-52 (discussing idea of military theocracy). The
blueprint implemented by the military followed closely the design advocated by Sayyid
Abul a'la Maududi. SAYYID ABUL A'LA MAUDUDI, THE IsLAMIC LAw AND CONSTITUTION
(Khurshid Ahmad ed. and tran., 2d ed. 1960). See generaly CharlesJ. Adams, The Ideol-
ogy of Mawlana Mawdudi, in SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS AND RElIGION 371 (Donald Eugene
Smith ed., 1966); Barbara D. Metcalf, Islamic Arguments in Contemporaiy Pakistan, in Is-
LAM AND THE POLITCAL ECONOMY OF MEANING: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF MUSLIM Dis-
COURSE 132 (William R. Roff ed., 1987).
162. Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, P.O. No. 4 (Feb. 9, 1979),
1979 P.L.D. (Central Statutes) 33 (Pak.). See generally Rubya Mehdi, The Offence of Rape
in the Islamic Law of Pakistan, 18 INT'L J. Soc. L. 19 (1990); Evan Gottesman, The
Remergnce of Qjsas and Diyat in Pakistan, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. 11Ev. 433 (1991-92).
163. See Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1281-82.
164. Id.; NoMAN, supra note 38, at 124.
165. Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1279-82.
166. Shariat Benches of Superior Courts Order, P.O. No. 22 (Dec. 2, 1978), 1978
P.L.D. (Central Statutes) 6 (Pak.).
167. MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 30, at 35.
168. Kennedy, supra note 7, at* 94. The demands included: (i) removal of
Ahmadis from civil bureaucratic and military posts; (ii) closure of Ahmadi mosques;
(iii) prohibition against Ahmadis calling the azan (call to prayer); (iv) prohibition of
missionary activity by Ahmadis; (v) prohibition of publication or dissemination of
Ahmadi literature; and (vi) confiscation of all Ahmadi literature. Id.
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launched after April 30, 1984.169 The martial law regime com-
plied with the demands, and on April 26, 1984, Ordinance XX
of 1984 was issued.1 7
A constitutional petition was filed in the Lahore High Court
challenging Ordinance XX as violating the constitutionally guar-
anteed fundamental right to profess, practice, and propagate
religion. The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition on the
ground that the Constitution had been effectively suspended
since the declaration of martial law on July 5, 1977, and hence
the legislative power of the martial law regime, which had en-
acted Ordinance XX, did not suffer from any limitations set out
by the fundamental rights found in the Constitution. 171 This was
in line with the Pakistan Supreme Court's earlier validation of
the imposition of martial law in 1977 under the doctrine of ne-
cessity, and its recognition of the unfettered legislative power of
the extra-constitutional regime. 7
2
Ordinance XX was also challenged as violating principles
laid down by the Qur'an and the Sunnah before the newly estab-
lished Federal Shariat Court ("FSC") .17s The FSC dismissed the
petitions and held that Ordinance XX was simply "consequential
to the Constitutional Amendment of 1974 by which the
[Ahmadis] ... were declared non-Muslims." 174 The FSC accused
the Ahmadis of disregarding their designation as non-Muslims
by the 1974 constitutional amendment, and of outraging the
169. Id.
170. Id. at 95.
171. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1734 (Pak.) (discussing Constitutional Peti-
tion No. 2309 of 1984).
172. Nusrat Bhutto v. Chief of Army Staff, 1977 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 657 (Pak.); see gener-
ally Mahmud, Praetorianism, supra note 26, at 1282-94; Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine of
State Necessity in Pakistan, 16 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 341 (1983).
173. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman v. Pakistan, 1984 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) 136, 137 (Pak.). The
credibility of the Shariat Court was rather low at this point, following the flip-flop on
the rajam (stoning to death) issue. See Hazoor Bakhsh v. Pakistan, 1981 P.L.D. (F.S.C.)
145 (Pak.). In 1981, the Federal Shariat Court ("FSC") had decided that rajam was
repugnant to injunctions of Islam. Id. The military regime expressed displeasure, arbi-
trarily changed the composition of the FSC, and the reconstituted court proceeded to
hold in an extraordinary review that rajam was not inconsistent with Islam. Pakistan v.
Hazoor Bakhsh, 1983 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) 255 (Pak.); see generally Ann E. Mayer, The Shari'ah:
A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?, in IsLAmic LAw AND JURISPRUDENCE
(Nicholas Heer ed., 1990) (discussing Hazoor Bakhsh case).
174. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, 1984 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) at 137 (Pak.). It was a sign of the
changed times that this ruling was issued by Chief Justice Aftab Hussain, author of the
1976 Mobashir opinion. Mobashir v. Bokhari, 1978 P.L.D. (Lah.) 113 (Pak.).
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feelings of Muslims. The FSC insisted that in light of Ordinance
XX the Ahmadis "can call their places of worship by any other
name and call the adherents of their religion to prayer by use of
any other method. This does not amount to interference with
the right to profess or practise their religion." 175
Two months later, the FSC gave its detailed ruling on the
issue. 176 The first 70 pages of the 106-page opinion are devoted
to elaborating the doctrinal differences between the Ahmadis
and other Muslim sects and schools in order to establish. that the
Ahmadis are non-Muslims.1 77 The FSC held that "[t]he Ordi-
nance, therefore, restrains them from calling themselves what
they are not; since they cannot be allowed to deceive anybody
specially [sic] the Muslim Ummah by passing off as Muslims." 1
According to the FSC, the effect of the Second Amendment was
that Ahmadis "should have refrained from directly or indirectly
posing as Muslims but they obstinately persevered in trying the
patience of Muslim Ummah by acting contrarily." 79 If the
Ahmadis "had taken steps to implement the Constitutional pro-
visions the promulgation of this Ordinance might not have been
required."i8 0 But "[i]f an Islamic State in spite of its being in
power allows a non-Muslim to adopt the Shia'ar of Islam which
affects the distinguishing characteristics of Muslim Ummah, it
will be the failure of that State in discharge of its duties."' 8 The
FSC dismissed arguments based on Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights18 2 ("UDHR"), with the curious ob-
servation that "[t] here is nothing in this charter to give to the
citizens of a country the right to propagate or preach his reli-
gion."' As for the Article 20 guarantees, the FSC took the posi-
175. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman, 1984 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) at 137 (Pak.).
176. Majibur Rehman v. Pakistan, 1985 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) 8 (Pak.).
177. Majibur Rehman, 1985 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) at 17-93 (Pak.).
178. Id. at 93.
179. Id. at 99. According to the Court, the Ahmadis' propagation of their beliefs:
[T]ouch the usual chord of the educated Muslims' distaste for the intense
sectarianism and persistent rigidity of the Ulema and tend to draw them to-
wards what they preach to be liberalism in Islam. This strategy... bears strong
resemblance to the passing off by a trader of his inferior goods as the superior
well known goods of a reputed firm.
Id. at 100.
180. Id. at 100.
181. Id. at 111.
182. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18, at 71.
183. MajiburRehman, 1985 P.L.D. (F.S.C.) at 117 (Pak.).
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tion that these are "subject to law and order," because the
Ahmadis:
[C] ontinued to propagate their religion freely by publication
of books, journals, etc. as well as among individual Muslim
[sic] to create resentment which obviously was likely to create
law and order situation [sic] .... In these circumstances the
Ordinance appears to be covered by the exception in Article
20 about its being subject to the maintenance of law and or-
der.1
84
Further, the FSC dismissed the argument that an implied
covenant existed between Jinnah and the Ahmadis regarding
religious freedom with the comment that "[n]o covenant be-
tween the [Ahmadis] and [Jinnah] was shown to us that they
shall be treated as Muslims, nor did this question arise at the
time of establishment of Pakistan or during the lifetime of [Jin-
nah] .185
While the majority opinion in Zaheeruddin followed the as-
sumptions, arguments, and even the tone of the FSC in Majibur
Rehman, and expressly adopted its holdings as its own, 186 the mi-
nority opinion expressly departed. In his minority opinion, Jus-
tice Shafiur Rahman began by rejecting theposition that, due to
the incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a substantive
part of the Pakistan Constitution by virtue of Article 2-A, the
whole Constitution, including the fundamental rights provisions,
is controlled by and subordinate to injunctions of Islam." 7 Rely-
184. Id. at 119-20. Compare the restrictive construction of "subject to law" clause
fashioned by the Supreme Court in Sarfraz Hussain Bokhari v. District Magistrate,
Kasur, 1983 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 172 (Pak.).
185. Id. at 98-99; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 91.
186. .Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at, 1755-56 (Pak.). The Supreme Court
rested this posture on its reading of Chapter 3-A of the Pakistan Constitution of 1973,
which set up the parallel Federal Shariat Court system. PAK. CONST. (1973) arts. 203A-
203H. This Chapter was inserted into the Constitution by the extra-constitutional mili-
tary regime through Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1980, P.O. No. 1 (May 27,
1980), P.L.D. (Central Statutes) 89 (Pak.). Zaheemudin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1756
(Pak.). According to the Court, this chapter dictated that a finding by the FSC, if it is
either not challenged in the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court or upheld
by the latter, is binding on the Supreme Court. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the
Mujibur Rehman decision was challenged before the Shariat Appellate Bench of the
Supreme Court, but the appellants had withdrawn the appeal, leading the Bench to
hold that the "[Judgment of the Federal Shariat Court shall rule the field." Id. at 1755
(quoting Mujibur Rehman v. Pakistan, 1988 P.L.D. (Shariat App. Bench) 167 (Pak.)).
187. Zaheeruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1742-44 (Pak.).
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ing on his concurring opinion in Hakim Khan v. Pakistan,88 Jus-
tice Rahman recalled that:
The provisions of Article 2-A were never intended at any stage
to be self-executory or to be adopted as a test of repugnancy
or of contrariety. It was beyond the power of the Court to
have applied the test of repugnancy by invoking Article 2-A of
the Constitution for striking down any other provision of the
Constitution .. 89
Justice Rahman also rejected the proposition that, given the
"subject to law" qualifier to the freedom of religion provision of
the Constitution, Ordinance XX qualifies as law and therefore
will hold good notwithstanding any apparent or substantial con-
flict with the right. Justice Rahman quoted Jibendra Kishore v.
Province of East Pakistan in which Chief Justice Muhammad
Munir stated:
I refuse to be a party to any such pedantic, technical and nar-
row construction of the Article in question, for I consider it to
be a fundamental canon of construction that a Constitution
should receive a liberal interpretation in favor of the citizen,
especially with respect to those provisions which were
designed to safeguard the freedom of conscience and wor-
ship.190
Justice Rahman noted that Section 2 of Ordinance XX, which
provides that "provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect
notwithstanding any order or decision of any Court," is a refer-
ence to the Mobashir case, and termed the case "a very exhaustive
and illuminative judgment on the subject." 9 ' He declined, with-
out discussion, to adopt the position that the FSC's holding in
188. Hakim Khan v. Pakistan, 1992 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 595 (Pak.).
189. Zaheruddin, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) at 1743-44 (Pak.) (quoting Hakim Khan, 1992
P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 595 (Pak.)).
190. Id. at 1744 (quotingJibendra Kishore Acharyya Chowdhury v. East Pakistan,
1957 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 9, 41 (Pak.) [hereinafterflbendra Kishore]). Concluding thatJibendra
Kishore dealt with the issue "adequately and effectively," Shafiur Rahman again quoted
Chief Justice Munir:
[C]onstitutional instruments should receive a broader and more liberal con-
struction than statutes, for the power dealt with in the former case is original
and unlimited and in the latter case limited, and constitutional rights should
not be permitted to be nullified or evaded by astute verbal criticism, without
regard to the fundamental aim and object of the instrument and the princi-
ples on which it is based.
Id. at 1745 (quoting Jibendra Kishore, 1957 P.L.D. (S.Ct) at 42 (Pak.)).
191. Id. at 1746.
82 FORDHAMINTERNVATIONAL LAWJOURNAL
Majibur Rehman had precedential value because it had been af-
firmed by the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. 192
Finally, he took the position that most of Ordinance XX was un-
constitutional as violating freedom of religion, equal protection
of the law, and freedom of speech.19 3 He ended his opinion
with the noteworthy statement that:
Our difficulty in handling these appeals has been that the re-
spondents have by and large argued the matter as if the vires
of the impugned portions of the Ordinance are being tested
[more] for their inconsistency ... with injunctions of Islam
than for their inconsistency with the Fundamental Rights.
This has brought in religious scholars volunteering to assist
the Court generating [a] lot of avoidable heat and contro-
versy at the argument and post argument stage. 94
This statement accurately characterizes both the doctrinal
and practical dilemmas Pakistan's judiciary faces when con-
fronted with the question of religious freedom: (i) whether the
basic law of the land is the written Constitution or the injunc-
tions of Islam; and (ii) how to keep the judicial process immune
from extra-legal political realities of reassertion of religious fun-
damentalism and sectarianism. Furthermore, this statement
raises questions about constitutional guarantees with respect to
'the rule of law in Pakistan, the independence of the judiciary,
and the viability of Pakistan's courts as the protector of funda-
mental rights of citizens.
A recent book-length study of the courts and constitutional
politics in Pakistan195 advances two broad conclusions: (i) that
the courts "tailor[ed] their decisions for expedience,"196 and
consequently imbued extraconstitutional state actions with "col-
ors of constitutionalism . . . offering a veneer of legitimacy
through the medium of legality."1 97 and; (ii) that the courts con-
currently "kept alive political ideals... [and] helped create a
constituency for ideas of citizens' rights and state obligations."1 98
This Article's examination of the genesis and development of
192. Id. at 1739.
193. Id. at 1746-48.
194. Id. at 1749.
195. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE, supra note 83, at 8.
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 8.
198. Id.
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freedom of religion jurisprudence in Pakistan supports the first
conclusion. The second conclusion is valid for the first two de-
cades of the State's existence and only partly true during the
Fourth Republic. Over the last fifteen years, however, the courts
have completely capitulated before majoritarian religious forces
and abdicated their role as guardians of the constitutional right
of freedom of religious belief and practice. This survey of judi-
cial practice warrants the conclusion that the assumptions and
propositions of Zaheeruddin are patently mistaken: (i) given the
diametrically opposed conclusions about Ahmadis' right of reli-
gious practice drawn by Mobashir and Zaheeruddin, supposedly
from the same corpus of Islamic law, the Shari'ah must be viewed
as, at best, a methodology, and not as a code of substantive
rules;1 99 the texts considered authoritative contain inconsistent
and contradictory pronouncements regarding freedom of reli-
gion and rights of religious minorities, and any use of these au-
thorities is inherently contingent, leading to indeterminate out-
comes; (ii) incorporation of the Objectives Resolution as a sub-
stantive part of the Constitution does not automatically overrule
the foundational jurisprudence regarding religious freedom.
The Resolution was a political compromise, full of internal in-
consistencies and contradictions. The Resolution expressly en-
visages that minorities are free to "profess and practice their reli-
gions,"2"' and the legislative history of the Resolution is replete
with assurances that it was not intended to curtail religious free-
dom;20 1 (iii) there is no one specific concept of the Islamic State,
199. See Joseph Schacht, Problems of Modem Islamic Legislation, 12 STUDiA ISLAMICA
108 (1960); Ann E. Mayer, supra note 173, at 177; Aziz AL-AzmEH, ISLAMS AND MODERNI-
TIES 12 (1993). The author notes that "Islamic law is not a code. This is why the fre-
quently heard call for its 'application' is meaningless, most particularly when calls are
made for the application of shari'a - this last term does not designate law, but is a
general term designating good order, much like nomos or dharma." Id.; ABDULLAHI A.
AN-NA'IM, TowARDs AN IsLAMIc REFORMATION: CIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAw xiv (1990) ("Shari'a is not the whole of Islam but instead is an inter-
pretation of its fundamental sources as understood in a particular historical context.").
200. MAHMOOD, CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 11, at 46.
201. Id. at 46-51. The Zaheensddin majority conveniently ignored Hakim Khan v.
Pakistan, 1992 P.L.D. (S.Ct.) 595 (Pak.). The Hakim Khan Court, after an extensive
discussion, rejected the proposition that the Objectives Resolution has "an overwhelm-
ing position in the Constitution... [and is] in control of the Constitution," giving the
courts the power to strike down provisions of the Constitution that are in conflict with
injunctions of Islam. Id. at 612. The Court held that due to the Resolution's incorpora-
tion as a substantive part of the Constitution:
[T] he role of the Objectives Resolution ... has not been fundamentally trans-
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but several,2 °2 and there has never been any consensus in Paki-
stan on the desirability or nature of an "Islamic State;" °2  (iv)
constitutional governance and rule of law mandate that responsi-
bility for the breakdown of law and order be placed upon those
who take the law into their own hands; and (v) the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression and belief applies "not only
to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favorably received or re-
formed from the role envisaged for it at the outset; namely that it should serve
as beacon light for the Constitution-makers .... [A]ccordingly now when a
question arises whether any of the provisions of the 1973-Constitution exceeds
in any particular respect, the limits prescribed by Allah Almighty ... this in-
consistency will be resolved.., by the National Assembly itself... through the
amendment process laid down in the Constitution itself.
Id. at 619-20; see Asif S.K. Khosa, The Ineffective Effect of Artice 2-A, Constitution of Pakistan,
42 ALL PAmsrAN LEGAL DECISIONS 50, 50 (1990); Charles H. Kennedy, Repugnancy to
Islam-Who Decides?: Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan, 41 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 769 (1992).
202. See, e.g., EDWARD MORTIMER, FArrH AND POWER 406 (1982). Mortimer surveys
six different theoretical models of the Islamic State to show that despite common char-
acteristics, each model is unique and fashioned by a host of local, political, historical,
and economic factors. Id. Mortimer concludes that "[w] estern notions about 'Islam' as
a geopolitical force ... are fundamentally misplaced .... [It is more useful, in politics
at any rate, to think about Muslims than to think about Islam." Id.; JALAL, DEMOCRACY
AND AUTHORITARIANISM, supra note 45, at 239 ("Islam as religion has been open to far
too many conflicting interpretations to serve as a stable ideological anchor for the
state"); see generally LEONARD BINDER, ISLAMIC LIBERALISM: A CRITIQUE OF DEVELOPMENT
IDEOLOGIES (1988); .HAMID ENAYAT, MODERN ISLAMIC POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE RE-
SPONSE OF THE SHI'I AND SUNNI MUSLIMS TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1982);JOHN EsPo-
sITo, ISLAM AND POLITICS (3d ed. 1991); ISLAM, POLITICS AND THE STATE: THE PAKISTAN
EXPERIENCE (Mohammad Asghar Khan ed., 1985).
203. SeeJALAL, DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIAN, supra note 45, at 220-21 (noting
that "invok[ing] Islam as an ideological monolith in the state-sponsored discourse...
did not alter the basic fact that the meaning attached to Islam in religious and cultural
practices in locality and region differed in essentials from the monolithic ideological
protestations"); BINDER, supra note 23, at 10-109 (discussing four distinct conceptions of
state-building that competed during process preceding passage of first Constitution in
1956, and commenting that document represented pragmatic bargain after ideological
purities were compromised); Wayne A. Wilcox, Ideological Dilemmas in Pakistan's Political
Culture, in SOUTH ASIAN POLITIcS AND RELIGION 339 (Donald E. Smith ed., 1966) (exam-
ining ideological controversy surrounding concept of Islam and Islamic State, with ref-
erence to impact of Pakistan's complex and variegated social structure and many differ-
ent intellectual and cultural traditions); ERWIN I.J. ROSENTHAL, ISLAM IN THE MODERN
NATIONAL STATE 203 (1965). Rosenthal comments that
It is difficult to decide whether the vagaries of the process of framing a worka-
ble constitution are due to the so-called Islamic ideology being open to as
many different interpretations as movements, parties and-people use the term,
almost like a magic wand, or to a more deep-rooted disagreement about the
aims and objects of an independent Muslim state and nation in the subconti-
nent which has produced this ambiguous ideology.
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garded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to
those that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the
population." 04
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS MANDATED BY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Pakistan's judicial treatment of international legal norms of
freedom of religion remains incomplete, inconsistent, and arbi-
trary.2 °5 In order appreciate how far Pakistan's judicial practice
has strayed fiom applicable norms, one must retrace the evolu-
tion of international standards of freedom of religion, Pakistan's
pioneering role in developing such standards, and the applica-
bility of these standards in domestic courts.
A. Evolution of Modern International Legal Norms on Freedom
of Religion
As it has since antiquity, freedom of religion remains a cen-
tral question in international law. 20 6 The U.N. General Assem-
bly's adoption of the UDHR in 1948 represented the first signifi-
cant step in constructing a universal norm for protecting free-
dom of religion.20 7 Taking its lead from the Charter of the
United Nations, which emphasizes non-discrimination on the ba-
sis of religion in its main articles addressing human rights, 2 8 Ar-
ticle 18 of the UDHR provides that:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his reli-
gion or belief, freedom, either alone or in community with
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
204. Handyside Case, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 22 (1976).
205. See supra notes 156-204 and accompanying text (discussingjudicial treatment
of religious freedom in Pakistan).
206. See generally Stephen C. Neff, An Evolving International Legal Norm of Religious
Freedom: Problems and Prospects, 7 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 543 (1977).
207. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at 71; see generally THEUNVERSAL DECLA-
RATION OF HuM.mA RsoIrrs: A COMMENTARY (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
208. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. Article 1 of the Charter states that one of the purposes
of the United Nations is to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and
... fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or reli-
gion." Id. Article 55 provides that: "the United Nations shall promote ... universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. art. 55; see generally Brice Dickson,
The United Nations and Freedom of Religion, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 327 (1995).
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belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. 209
The colloquy that took place between the representatives of
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan during the discussion of the Draft
UDHR210 is very instructive. The Saudi delegate took the posi-
tion that the draft was based largely on the patterns of culture
dominant in the West, patterns frequently "at variance with the
patterns of culture of Eastern States."2 1' He particularly took is-
sue with Article 18's construction of freedom of conscience as
including the right to change one's religion. 2 According to the
Saudi delegate, the right to change one's religion was not recog-
nized in Islamic law, and he castigated representatives of Islamic
countries who voted for the provision as a betrayal of their con-
stituency.213 The representative of Pakistan, however, character-
ized the adoption of the UDHR as an "epoch-making event," and
"thought it necessary to set out very clearly his delegation's posi-
tion as to that part of article 19" which "dealt with the freedom
of conscience, including freedom to change one's religion."214
He said that "the Moslem religion had unequivocally proclaimed
the right to freedom of conscience and had declared itself
against any kind of compulsion in matters of faith or religious
practices. The Pakistan delegation would therefore vote for arti-
cle 19, and would accept no limitation on its provisions."21
Subsequent to the adoption of the UDHR, the right to free-
209. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18, at 74.
210. Continuation of the Discussion on the Draft International Declaration of Human
Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 3d Sess., 182d plen. mtg. at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/777
(1948).
211. Id. at 49. Article 19 in the Draft became art. 18 in the UDHR. Universal
Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18, at 74.
212. Universal Declaration, supra note 1, art. 18, at 74.
213. DAVID LrrTLE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WEST-
ERN AND ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 35-36 (1988).
214. Continuation of the Discussion on the Draft Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
supra note 210, at 1-2.
215. Id. According to the Pakistani delegate:
The Koran expressly said: "Let he who chooses to believe, believe, and he who
chooses to disbelieve, disbelieve," and it formally condemned not lack of faith
but hypocrisy. The Moslem religion was a missionary religion: it strove to per-'
suade men to change their faith and alter their way of living, so as to follow the
faith and way of living it preached, but it recognized the same right of conver-
sion for other religions as for itself.
Id.; see John Kelsay, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in DAVID LITTLE ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CONFLICT OF CULTURES: WESTERN AND
ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (1988).
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dom of conscience and religion was enshrined in various multi-
lateral treaties and United Nation's declarations. 2 16 The Geneva
Conventions memorialized the rights of both civilians and pris-
oners during periods of war to profess and practice their reli-
gions.21 7 Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights21 s provides that:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and free-
dom, either individually or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching .... No one shall be sub-
ject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 19
Similarly, the American Declaration of the Rights and Du-
ties of Man,220 the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms,2 21  the American Convention on
Human Rights, 222 and the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights, 223 provide that every person has the right to freely
216. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 34, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3347, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 164; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 24, 27,
38, 58, 86 and 93, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3535, 3536, 3542, 3555, 3372, 3577, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
304, 306, 312, 324, 342, 346-48; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178, 1977 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702), at
11 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted at the Ninth Interna-
tional Conference of American States, art. III, in 1 ANNALS ORGANIZATION AM. Sis. 130,
130 (1949); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230, Europ. T.S. No. 5, at 5.
217. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 216, art. 34, 6 U.S.T. at 3347, 75 U.N.T.S. at 164; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 216, arts. 24, 27, 38, 58, 86
and 93, 6 U.S.T. at 3535, 3536, 3542, 3555, 3372, 3577, 75 U.N.T.S. at 304, 306, 312,
324, 342, 346-48.
218. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 216, art. 18,
999 U.N.T.S. at 178, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6, at 11.
219. Id.
220. O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of Ameri-
can States, art. III, in 1 ANNALS ORGANIZATION AM. STs. 130, 130 (1949).
221. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 216, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230, Europ. T.S. No. 5, at 5.
222. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 12, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 5, 9 I.L.M. 673, 679 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
223. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 8, 21
I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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profess a religious faith and to manifest and practice it both in
public and in private.
International efforts to codify freedom of religion
culminated in the adoption, by consensus, of the Declaration on
the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimina-
tion Based on Religion or Belief224 ("Declaration"). Although it
lacks the binding nature of an international agreement, the Dec-
laration is "regarded throughout the world as articulating the
fundamental rights of freedom of religion and belief."22 1 'The
Declaration gives specific content to the general statements of
the rights of freedom of belief and freedom from discrimination
based on religion or belief contained in the major human rights
instruments. The "savings clause" of the Declaration preserves
the standards set forth in the Universal Declaration and the In-
ternational Covenants by providing that "[n] othing in the pres-
ent Declaration shall be construed as restricting or derogating
from any right defined in the UDHR and the International Cov-
enants on Human Rights."22 6 Because it is enunciated in norma-
tive terms, elevating the rights and freedoms in question to nor-
mative status, the Declaration has a certain legal effect, "under
the criteria deriving from international legal decisions."2 27 Arti-
cles 4 and 7 leave no doubt that the U.N. General Assembly in-
tended the Declaration to be normative and not merely horta-
tory. 2  Under Article 4, states are required to "make all efforts
to enact or rescind legislation" and to take other effective meas-
ures to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or be-
224. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimi-
nation Based on Religion or Belief, GA Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No.
51, at 171, U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration]; see DonnaJ. Sullivan,
Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Religious Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 Am. J. INT'L. L. 487 (1988).
225. Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intol-
erance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 44th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/44/Add.2 (1988); see
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Be-
lief, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minori-
ties, U.N. ESCOR, 39th Sess., at 48-49, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1986).
226. Declaration, supra note 224, art. 8.
227. Analytical Compilation of Comments and Views on the Implementation of the Declara-
tion on the Right to Development, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 11 th Sess. at 5, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/AC 39/1988/L.2 (1988). The document is an analytical compilation of
views regarding the significance of the Declaration on the Right to Development, and
was prepared by the Secretary General. Id.
228. Declaration, supra note 224, arts. 4, 7, at 171-72.
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lief.2 9 Article 7 imposes a more categorical obligation, by pro-
viding that "[t]he rights and freedoms set forth in the present
Declaration shall be accorded in national legislations in such a
manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself of such rights
and freedoms in practice." 3 ° Article 1 affirms the right to free-
dom of thought, conscience, and belief, and the right to mani-
fest one's religion or belief.23 1 Article 2 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of religion or belief.2 3 2 The freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion should be distinguished from the free-
dom to manifest religion or belief. No limitations upon the free-
dom of thought and freedom to profess a religion or belief are
permissible.3 3 In contrast, the freedom to manifest one's reli-
gion or beliefs may be subject to restraints imposed to protect
other human rights and the various societal interests recognized
by international human rights instruments. 234
The use or threat of coercion to compel persons to recant
or to convert, which would impair the freedom to profess a reli-
gion or belief of one's choice, is also forbidden. To attain the
core aim of the Declaration, the protection of the right to pro-
fess any religion or belief, coercion should be interpreted to in-
clude mental or psychological means of compulsion as well as
physical means, and must extend to such practices as condition-
ing the receipt of public benefits or services upon renunciation
or acceptance of religious belief.2 5 Article 1 of the Declaration
permits restraints prescribed by law that are necessary for the
229. Id. art. 4, at 171-72. Article 4 states that:
1'. All states shall take effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion or belief in the recognition, exercise and en-
jo ment of human rights and fundamental freedoms in all fields of civil, polit-
ical, social and cultural life.
2. All states shall make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation where neces-
sary to prohibit any such discrimination, and to take all appropriate measures
to combat intolerance on the grounds of religion or other beliefs in this mat-
ter.
Id.
230. Id. art. 7, at 172.
231. Id. art. 1, at 171.
232. Id. art. 2, at 171.
233. See Karl J. Partsch, Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTs: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND PoLcICAL RIGHTS
209, 213-14 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) (distinguishing right to adhere to one's own
"conscience" from right to outwardly manifest one's beliefs).
234. Id. at 214.
235. See Sullivan, supra note 224, at 493-96.
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protection of public safety, order, health, morals, and the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of others. Given the breadth and
vagueness of these terms, analyses of specific restrictions must
guard against interpretations that would eviscerate the safe-
guards created and magnify uncertainties concerning the resolu-
tion of conflicts. Article 6 sketches the contours of the basic
right to religious freedom that is broadly stated in Article 1.236
The companion principle to the freedom to manifest reli-
gion is the right to be free from discrimination on grounds of
religion or belief.23 7 The Declaration prohibits distinctions that
have adverse effects on human rights in addition to those that
are implemented for the purpose of impairing or nullifying such
rights. In barring unintentional as well as intentional acts of dis-
crimination, Article 2 expands its protection by permitting the
inference of purpose from effect.23 8 The definition set forth in
236. Declaration, supra note 224, art. 6, at 172. The article stipulates that, subject
to provisions of article 1(3):
the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief shall include,
inter alia, the following freedoms:
(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to
establish and maintain places for these purposes;
(b) To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institu-
tions;
(c) To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and
materials related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
(d) To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
(f) To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from
individuals and institutions;
(g) To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders
called for by the requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
(h) To observe days of rest and celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accord-
ance with the precepts of one's religion or belief;
(i) To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communi-
ties in matters of religion or belief at the national and international levels.
Id.
237. Id. art. 2, at 171. The article provides:
1. No one shall be subject to discrimination by any State, institution, group of
persons or person on grounds of religion or belief.
2. For the purposes of the present Declaration, the expression "intolerance
and discrimination based on religion or belief" means any distinction, exclu-
sion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and having as its
purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal
basis.
Id.
238. See THEODOR MERON, HuMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A
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Article 2(2) of the Declaration refers not to discrimination
alone, but to "intolerance and discrimination." 23 9 Article 4(2)
suggests a distinction between the two in calling for legislative
action to prohibit discrimination while exhorting states to take
"all appropriate measures" to combat intolerance.240
Core rights are fundamental rights that cannot be violated
under any circumstances. International law currently recognizes
twelve non-derogable core rights, including the right to freedom
of religion and prohibition of discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion.241  The core rights are biding on all states, whether the
states are signatories to a particular convention or not, as princi-
ples of customary international law.242 Non-core rights are those
human rights that may be limited or suspended by a state. Such
derogation is permissible in two circumstances: (i) during war or
public emergencies; and (ii) in order to protect national secur-
ity, public health, safety, morals, or the rights and freedoms of
others. 43
While freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief
are non-derogable, the freedom to manifest one's religion or be-
liefs may be subject to limitations. The Siracusa Principles on
the Limitations and Derogation Provisions in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights clarify, in general terms,
the scope and nature of limitation clause provisions and set forth
several principles. 244 A limitation that is justifiably "necessary" is
CRITIQUE OF INSTRUMENTS AND PROCESS 13-14 (1986) (explaining that, within scope of
Convention, discriminatory effects may inherently point to discriminatory intent);Jack
Greenberg, Race, Sex and Religious Discrimination in International Law, in HuMAN RIGHTS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POuCY IsSUES 322 (Theodor Meron ed., 1984) (con-
trasting with U.S. Supreme Court decision in Washington v. Davis, which held that dis-
criminatory effect without purpose does not violate Constitution).
239. Declaration, supra note 224, art. 2(2), at 171.
240. See id. art. 4(2), at 172.
241. See The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in 7 HUM. Rrs. Q. 3,
12 (1985) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.; Richard B. Lillich, The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a
State of Emergenty, 79 Am. J. IrT'L. L. 1072, 1073-75 (1985); Daniel O'Donnell, Commen-
tary by the Rapporteur on Derogation, 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 23 (1985); Study of the Implications for
Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations Known as State of Siege or Emer-
gency, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Agenda Item 10, at
18-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (1982); Alexandre Kiss, Commentary by the
Rapporteur on the Limitation Provisions, 7 HUM. RTs. Q. 15 (1985) [hereinafter Kiss].
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one that responds to a pressing public or social need, pursues a
legitimate governmental purpose, and is proportionate to the
governmental purpose.2 1 A limitation "prescribed by law" can-
not be applied so as to jeopardize the essence of the right lim-
ited .2  The limiting law may not be vague, arbitrary, or unrea-
sonable in content or application. 47 To guarantee the appropri-
ateness of the law, adequate safeguards and effective legal
remedies must be available against illegal or abusive application
of the law.24 Limitations must not discriminate on the basis of
religion.249 The limitation clauses are to be interpreted strictly
in favor of the right at issue.2 50 Finally, the limitation must not
lower the protection for any human right to a greater extent
than what is permissible under international law.25'
The limitation clause provisions apply to several broadly de-
fined areas. "Public safety" means protection against danger to
the safety of persons or their physical integrity, or serious dam-
age to their property.252 A limitation for the protection of public
morals must be "essential to the maintenance of respect for fun-
damental values of the community."25 3 It must not be arbitrary,
and must allow for challenges and remedies against abuse. 5 4
"Public Order" is defined as "the sum of rules which ensure the
functioning of society or the set of fundamental principles on
which society is founded."2 5
The Constitution of Pakistan affords the State the power to
suspend some enumerated fundamental rights during emergen-
cies.2 56 The rights subject to suspension are listed in the Consti-
tution, and these do not include the freedom of religion enunci-
ated in Article 20.
245. Siracusa Principles, supra note 241, at 4.
246. Id. at 5.
247. Id. at 4.
248. Kiss, supra note 244, at 18.
249. Siracusa Principles, supra note 241, at 4.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 5.
252. Id. at 6.
253. Id.
254. Kiss, supra note 244, at 16.
255. Siracusa Principles, supra note 241, at 5.
256. PA&L CONST. (1973) art. 233.
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B. Domestic Applicability of International Human Rights Norms
Common law jurisdictions historically consider the law of
nations to be part of the law of the land. 57 While theoretical
debates continue unabated regarding the relationship between
international and municipal law, significant practical develop-
ments have taken place in this area. Before international fora,
Pakistan has taken the position that Ordinance XX is consistent
with all relevant international normative instruments. 258 Of par-
ticular relevance to the Pakistan judiciary's role in protecting
freedom of religion are the judicial colloquia on the domestic
application of international human rights norms. These collo-
quia provide an important forum for judges of common law ju-
risdictions to develop frameworks and standards of application
of international norms in domestic jurisdictions.
The first colloquium, held in February 1988 at Banglore,
adopted what have come to be known as the Banglore Princi-
ples. 2 9 The Banglore Principles emphasize the universality of
fundamental human rights norms and urge application of such
norms in domestic cases in order to enhance administration of
justice and the protection of individual rights and freedoms.
The Banglore Principles were later supplemented by the Harare
Declaration of Human Rights in 1989,6 ° the Banjul Affirmation
257. See BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 67 (1809).
258. Summary Record of 31st Meeting of Commission on Human Rights, 42nd Sess., 31st
mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/SR.31 (1986). For example, before the Commission
on Human Rights of the U.N.E.S.C., Pakistan took the position that:
The purpose of Ordinance No. 20 was merely to resolve a situation which had
led to much violence and to restrain certain Ahmadi practices which offended
orthodox Muslims, its provisions were fully consonant with article 29 of the
Universal Declaration [of Human Rights], article 18, paragraph 3, of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and article 1, paragraph 3, of
the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief. The Ordinance's provisions affected
none of the freedoms announced in article 6 of that Declaration, and the
restrictions it imposed were only of the sort to be found in the legislation of
other States.
Id. at 3.
259. I DEVELOPING HuMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: THE DOMESTIC APPUCATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NoRMs ix-x (Judicial Colloquium in Banglore, 1988).
260. Harare Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in II DEVELOPING HUMAN
RIGHTSJURISPRUDENCE: A SECOND JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NoRMS 11 (Judicial Colloquium in Harare, 1989).
The Harare Declaration acknowledged that:
Fundamental human rights and freedoms are inherent in mankind.... But
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in 1990,261 and the Abuja Confirmation in 1991.262
In his address before the Banglore Colloquium, Justice
Muhammad Haleem, the then Chief Justice of Pakistan, made
some remarkable observations. After tracing the evolution of
modern international human rights norms, he proposed that
"all rules of general international law created for humanitarian
purposes constitute jus cogens. "263 He took the position that:
The relationship between international law and municipal
law is a question of determining what are the most appropri-
ate judicial means of achieving, in state legal systems, the aims
and intentions lying behind the rules established by interna-
tional law.... A state has an obligation to make its municipal
law conform to its undertakings under treaties to which it is a
party. 2
64
He expressed the opinion that:
fine statements in domestic laws or international and regional instruments are
not enough. Rather it is essential to develop a culture of respect for interna-
tionally stated human rights norms which sees thesenorms applied in the do-
mestic laws of all nations and given full effect. Theymust not be seen as alien
to domestic law in national courts.
Id.
261. The Banjul Statement of Affirmation of the Banglore Principles and Harare
Declaration of Human Rights, reprinted in III DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRU-
DENCE: A THIRD JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS NORMS 3 (Judicial Colloquim in Banjul, 1990). The Banjul Affir-
mation again acknowledged that:
[F]undamental human rights and freedoms are inherent in humankind.
[and] any truly enlightened social order must be based firmly on respect for
individual human rights and freedoms, peoples' rights and economic and so-
cial equity.
Id.
262. The Abuja Confirmation of the Domestic Application of International
Human Rights Norms, reprinted in IV DEVELOPING HuMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE:
FOURTH JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS NoRMs ix (Judicial Colloquium in Abuja, 1991). The Abuja Confirma-
tion:
Reaffirmed the principles stated in Banglore, amplified in Harare, and af-
firmed in Banjul. These principles reflect the universality of human rights -
inherent in humankind - and the vital duties of the independent judiciary in
interpreting and applying national constitutions and laws in the light of those
principles.
Id.
263. Muhammad Haleem, Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms,
in IV DEVELOPING HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: A FOURTH JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM ON
THE DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NoRMs 101 (Judicial Col-
loquium in Abuja, 1991).
264. Id. at 101.
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A valid domestic jurisdiction defense can no longer be
founded on the proposition that the manner in which the
state treats its own national is ipso facto a matter within its
domestic jurisdiction . . . [because a] matter is essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state only if it is not
regulated by international law or if it is not capable of regula-
tion by international law. In the modem age of economic
and political interdependence, most questions which, on the
face of it, appear to be essentially domestic ones are, in fact,
essentially international.
265
Justice Haleem regarded the domestic application of human
rights norms "as a basis for implementing constitutional values
beyond the minimum requirements of the Constitution. The in-
ternational human rights norms are in fact part of the constitu-
tional expression of liberties guaranteed at the national level.
The domestic courts can assume the task of expanding these lib-
erties."2 6 6 He acknowledged that:
The exercise of judicial power to create an order of liberties
on a level higher than the respective constitutions is now con-
sidered to be an ingredient of judicial activism. The present
thinking at the international level supports an expanded role
of domestic courts for the observance of international human
rights norms. This reappraisal enables domestic courts to ex-
tend to citizens, via state constitutions, greater protection of
internationally recognized rights. 26 7
While Pakistan's Constitution has been singled out as being
one of the few that "conform to the standard proclaimed in Arti-
cle 6(b) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion and Be-
lief,"2 68 the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection' of Minorities expressed "grave
concern" at the promulgation of Ordinance XX, and found that
it openly:
Violates the right to liberty and security of the persons [sic];
the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, the
265. Id.
266. Id. at 103.
267. Id. at 103-04
268. Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intolerance and of Discrimination
on Grounds of Religion or Belief, U.N. Sub-Commission -on Prevention and Protection of
Minorities, 39th Sess., at 31, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26 (1986).
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right to freedom of thought, expression, conscience and reli-
gion, the right of religious minorities to profess and practise
their own religion, and the right to an effective legal rem-
edy. 2 6 9 .
Furthermore, the Sub-Commission expressly asked the Govern-
ment of Pakistan to "repeal Ordinance XX and to restore the
human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons in its ju-
risdiction." 7  The Sub-Commission's Report specifically called
attention to the "independence of the judiciary... as [a] gen-
eral principle of law of civilized nations [and an] essential ele-
ment of the effective legal remedy required of all nations. "271
The examination of freedom of religion jurisprudence in
Pakistan in Part III, above, demonstrates clearly that, far from
choosing the road ofjudicial activism in deploying international
human rights law to expand protection of vulnerable sections of
the society, Pakistan's superior judiciary has chosen the path of
least resistance to the whims and caprices of dominant political
forces. While in the earlier phase of robust protection, the
courts took pains to observe the emerging international norms
of freedom of religion, in later phases, when these norms con-
flicted with the abdication of judicial protection of religious mi-
nortifes, they were conveniently ignored. Notwithstanding its
self-image as a vigilant guardian of human rights,27 observers
have correctly concluded that "the judiciary in Pakistan does not
always enjoy the independence which is consistent with perform-
ance of judicial duties as a professional function."273 Instead of
protecting citizens, Pakistan's courts have "struck bargains with
269. The Situation in Pakistan, U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 41st Sess., at 102, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/57
(1985) [hereinafter Situation in Pakistan]; see Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimi-
nation ofAll Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religious Belief, U.N. Commis-
sion on Human Rights, 44th Sess., Item 23, at 2-6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1988/45/Add.1
(1988); see Berberian, supra note 12, at 678-89 (analyzing provisions of Ordinance XX
and compliance with international derogation standards).
270. Situation in Pakistan, supra note 269, at 102.
271. Id.
272. See Muhammed A. Zullah, Human Rights in Pakistan, 18 COMMONWEALTH L.
BUL. 1343 (1992). The author, then ChiefJustice of Pakistan, catalogues the efforts of
the superior courts to protect and enhance human rights. Id.
273. LAwASiA HuMAN RIGHTS COMMirEE, Lawyers in Pakistan, Extracts from a Report
on Their Independence and Freedom, N.Z. L.J. 92, 96 (1984). The compiler, who visited
Pakistan in 1983, commented that one result of the lack of judicial independence is
that "the top legal ability is found not on the Bench but at the Bar." Id.
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the state."2 74 Such bargains, in turn, have "endowed judicial ac-
tion with political consequentialism." 5 Their decisions "re-
flected 'ground realities,' including [the] mood of [the] masses
[and the] preferences of the power structure."2 76 A major casu-
alty of this process is the integrity and legitimacy of the judiciary
itself as it is subjected to unprecedented public criticism and de-
nunciations. 7 Mindful of the sinking prestige of the judiciary,
some scholars have urged that "[p] rudence in the service of self-
preservation may now require a new voice of assertion rather
than self-restraint." 278 Any new judicial voice of assertion regard-
ing freedom of religion and rights of religious minorities, how-
ever, is quite unlikely. What is likely is that the courts will con-
tinue to abide by the majoritarian and authoritarian political
currents.
CONCLUSION
At the dawn of its life as an independent state for the Mus-
lim-majority areas of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan sub-
scribed to three instrumentalities to guard against repression of,
and discrimination against, religious minorities. Politically, a
covenant was formed between religious minorities and the lead-
ership of the Pakistan movement. This covenant was the result
of repeated and unequivocal assurances to religious minorities
that they would enjoy all political and social rights as equal citi-
zens of a free state, and that religious beliefs and affairs of the
State would be kept separate. Constitutionally,. each successive
constitution of Pakistan guaranteed every citizen the right to
profess, practice, and propagate his religion, and every religious
denomination, and every sect thereof, the right to establish,
maintain, and manage its religious institutions. Internationally,
274. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE, supra note 83, at 13.
275. Id.
276. MusHAHin HUSSAIN & AjmAL. HUSSAIN, PAISTAN: PROBLEMS OF GOVERNANCE
55 (1993).
277. See, e.g., Zahid Hussain, TheJudiiay on Trial, NEWSUNE (Karachi), Feb. 1993,
at 26; I.A. Rehman, Crisis ofJustice, NEwsuNE (Karachi), Feb. 1993, at 34; Shahzada
Zulfiqar, Judges in the Dock, NEwstUNE (Karachi), Mar. 1994, at 66; Hasan Mujtaba, Crisis
in the Court, NEsLINE (Karachi), Apr. 1994, at 55; Zohra Yusuf, In the Name of the Law,
HERALD (Karachi), Apr. 1994, at 81; I.A. Rehman, Judging the Judges, NEWSuNE (Kara-
chi), June 1994, at 87; Aaner A. Khan, Judges in the Dock; HERALD ANNUAL (Karachi),
Jan. 1995, at 95.
278. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE, supra note 83, at 250.
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Pakistan spearheaded the codification of the universal human
rights of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.
This promising beginning, however, did not last long. As
successive political crises resulted in the erosion of constitutional
governance and the growth of praetorianism, guarantees of reli-
gious freedom and equality yielded to political expedience, in-
tolerance, and religious orthodoxy. The oversight role of Paki-
stan's superiorjudiciary, with regard to the constitutionally guar-
anteed right to freedom and equality of religion, particularly as
it relates to the Ahmadis, mirrors this general regression and de-
cay.
During Pakistan's first two decades, the superior courts ful-
filled their assigned role as guardians of constitutionally guaran-
teed freedom and equality of religion. Mindful of the implied
covenant, cognizant of international human rights norms, and
alert to constitutional mandates, they refused to make the con-
tent, sincerity, or validity of religious belief a justiciable matter,
and rejected the position that the fundamental right of freedom
of religion may be taken away by legislation because it is subject
to the law. During this initial period, the courts saw through the
political motive of the anti-Ahmadi movements, whereby Islamic
political groups and leaders who lacked popular support and se-
cure political constituencies attempted to capture a political liv-
ing space for themselves. It treated representations of Islamic
law as open-textured, contingent, amenable to indeterminate re-
sults, and, therefore, not useful as a doctrinal guide for judicial
pronouncements.
Ironically, the end of the phase of robustjudicial protection
of the freedom of religion coincided with the adoption of a con-
sensus Constitution in 1973 by a representative legislature.
When a morally timid and politically isolated regime acceded to
the demands of the second anti-Ahmadi agitation, and
sheparded the adoption of a constitutional amendment declar-
ing Ahmadis a non-Muslim minority, the superior courts refused
to question the validity of this development. Here the courts fell
into the jurisprudential hole they had dug for themselves when
they recognized the unfettered constitutional legislative power
of the legislature, and refused to invalidate constitutional legisla-
tion that undermined the basic structure and essential features
of the Constitution. Nevertheless, during this phase, even when
the courts felt obliged to subscribe to the terms of the constitu-
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tional amendment, they refused to proscribe public religious
practice by the Ahmadis. Instead the Court insisted that the
right to hold certain religious beliefs and opinions could not be
called into question in a court of law. While the courts were
silent about the implied covenant and international law, they did
seek support from a selection of authoritative texts of Islamic law
that buttressed their holdings of freedom of belief and practice
for religious minorities.
During the third and current phase, the deterioration con-
tinued, culminating in the complete abdication of judicial pro-
tection of freedom of religion, and the capitulation of the judici-
ary in the face of authoritarianism and the political rise of reli-
gious orthodoxy. By recognizing the validity, legitimacy, and
unfettered legislative power of the extraconstitutional regime in
1977, the judiciary became party to its own impotence. Thejudi-
ciary's degeneration was accelerated by the introduction of the
parallel Shari'at courts, assaults on the autonomy and indepen-
dence of judges, and wholesale changes in the Constitution to
facilitate a centralized executive state.
During the decade-long phase of military-sponsored "Is-
lamization," proponents of regressive and medieval models of
Shari'ah enjoyed a monopoly over public policy discourse. This
development, coupled with the general atmosphere of repres-
sion and fear, resulted in the superior courts conveniently choos-
ing to engage in polemical diatribes against Ahmadis. It also re-
sulted in the toleration of unconstitutional state conduct, and
the acceptance of a regressive model of the genesis and goals of
the polity. When faced with the question of rights of religious
minorities, the courts questioned the very existence of the im-
plied covenant of freedom of religion, rejected international law
as irrelevant to the issue, and held that the Pakistan Constitution
must yield to injunctions of regressive and medieval constructs
of Islam. In contradiction to their express holdings in the sec-
ond phase, authoritative Islamic pronouncements were now rep-
resented as allowing, even requiring, the state to suppress the
practice of religion by religious minorities.
Judicial review is the power of the courts to declare a gov-
ernmental measure either contrary to, or in accordance with,
the constitution or other governing law. Such a judicial pro-
nouncement either renders the measure invalid and void or vin-
dicates its validity. An independent judiciary's review of govern-
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mental acts is an essential feature of democratic governance, be-
cause it facilitates orderly functioning of different organs of the
state, and maintains the efficacy of constitutional guarantees of
individual and collective rights. This picture of judicial practice
holds true, however, only in settings where constitutional gov-
ernance, guarantees of fundamental rights, separation of pow-
ers, and independence of the judiciary form stable components
of the political culture.
In many post-colonial settings, however, these ideals have
remained elusive. Chronic political instability, born of factors
outside the control of judiciaries, precludes stable constitutional
governance, and renders the judicial branch insufficiently insu-
lated from political forces. Consequently, dominant political
forces assert a determinative influence over judicial pronounce-
ments. Because the judiciary must remain sensitive to changing
political currents, judicial pronouncements are fraught with in-
consistencies and unpredictability. In turn, the identification
and application of sources of controlling norms are indetermi-
nate and contingent. The judiciary's deference to dominant
political forces makes it a party to the erosion of its own inde-
pendence and legitimacy. This sustained erosion renders the ju-
diciary less able to furnish protection of rights and freedoms to
vulnerable sections of society.
